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Abstract 
Growing usage of smart and portable electronic devices demands embedded 
system designers to provide solutions with better performance and reduced 
power consumption. Due to the new development of IoT and embedded 
systems usage, not only power and performance of these devices but also 
security of them is becoming an important design constraint. In this work, a 
novel aggressive scaling based on timing speculation is proposed to overcome 
the drawbacks of traditional DVFS and provide security from power analysis 
attacks at the same time.   
Dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS) is proven to be the most 
suitable technique for power efficiency in processor designs. Due to its 
promising benefits, the technique is still getting researchers attention to trade 
off power and performance of modern processor designs. The issues of 
traditional DVFS are: 1) Due to its pre-calculated operating points, the system 
is not able to suit to modern process variations. 2) Since Process Voltage and 
Temperature (PVT) variations are not considered, large timing margins are 
added to guarantee a safe operation in the presence of variations. 
The research work presented here addresses these issues by employing 
aggressive scaling mechanisms to achieve more power savings with increased 
performance. This approach uses in-situ timing error monitoring and 
recovering mechanisms to reduce extra timing margins and to account for 
process variations. A novel timing error detection and correction mechanism, 
to achieve more power savings or high performance, is presented. This novel 
technique has also been shown to improve security of processors against 
differential power analysis attacks technique. Differential power analysis 
attacks can extract secret information from embedded systems without 
ii 
 
knowing much details about the internal architecture of the device.  Simulated 
and experimental data show that the novel technique can provide 
performance improvement of 24% or power savings of 44% while occupying 
less area and power overhead. Overall, the proposed aggressive scaling 
technique provides an improvement on power consumption and performance 
while increasing the security of processors from power analysis attacks. 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a general introduction to modern embedded system 
design constraints such as power consumption and security. In order to 
develop a system with these constraints, all levels of the design process 
must be addressed subject to constraints on the system performance and 
the quality of service [1]. This chapter starts by introducing the basics of 
power consumption and highlighting the system design hierarchical 
techniques that are used by semiconductor vendors to meet the market 
growing demands keeping power consumption as a constraint. It also 
gives a summary of this research work contributions towards power 
optimization and security of embedded systems. 
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1.1 Power Efficiency 
Power optimization is one of the fundamental necessities of the modern 
processor designs. Not only it contributes to increasing the battery life of 
small and smart embedded systems but it also helps to reducing the cost of 
cooling effects in high processor designs. Essentially, the market for 
embedded systems is ever growing and the need for power efficiency of 
the systems is also increasing. Traditionally, dynamic voltage and 
frequency scaling was the most suitable technique for balancing the 
performance and power consumption to meet the growing demands. 
However, during the last decade, it has mostly been associated with the 
application performance requirements with tight power constraint 
budgets. On one hand, due to the scaling of process technologies, it is no 
more suitable for process variations, while on the other hand, it is the 
industry approved technique due to its simple, efficient and effective 
design. To account for the variation, semiconductor manufacturers add 
extra margins to provide reliable and robust operation. However, the extra 
margins are limiting the processor high performance requirements or 
power savings [1]. 
New high performance or multi-core processors need to be designed and 
developed to meet the performance demands of the modern computing. 
However, these new processors pose many challenges for the designers, 
predominantly handling increased power consumption. Figure 1.1 shows 
the statistics for the power consumption up to 2020 [2]. This roadmap sets 
aggressive targets for power efficiency of future embedded systems to 
accommodate the performance requirements. As seen in the figure, the 
power requirement trend is increasing exponentially while creating more 
gap between the required and actual levels. This, increases the demand for 
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embedded systems power consumption, which has to be addressed at 
different levels of abstraction of the system design.  
 
Figure 1.1: Power requirements and trends through 2020 [2] 
1.2 Fundamentals of Power Consumption 
Traditionally, digital systems were designed with performance and 
physical size in mind and the other factors such as testability and power 
consumption were mainly regarded as side constraints. It was in the early 
90’s that power consumption became a main design constraint along with 
performance and physical size. The main driving factor for this trend is the 
exploding market for small and smart electronic devices that demand high 
functional density with the limited power supply of batteries.  
The total power consumption of a processor can be categorised as static 
and dynamic power. The amount of power dissipated when there is no 
circuit activity is called the static power and it mainly encompasses 
operating voltage, leakage current and fabrication process. The amount of 
CONTENT REMOVED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
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power dissipated when there is a switching activity is called the dynamic 
power and the overall power consumed by a CMOS device can be 
calculated by adding up these two powers. 
                             (1-1) 
                          (1-2) 
               
 
          (1-3) 
As in Equation (1-3), dynamic power depends on load capacitance, 
operating voltage and frequency. Scaling down frequency helps reducing 
power but it affects performance. Depending on the computational task, 
processor must intelligently choose the appropriate frequency to avoid 
running the system unnecessarily at a high speed clock for the entire 
period. Reducing operating voltage has a major impact on dynamic power 
because of the quadratic relation between voltage and power. Moreover, 
static power can also be minimised by reducing the operating voltage. 
Hence the voltage scaling is the most effective and commonly used 
technique. Voltage scaling is accomplished by identifying the critical and 
non-critical paths, separating and powering them with high and low 
voltages, and dynamically changing the supply voltage depending on the 
requirements. Another possible way to reduce dynamic power is reducing 
the load capacitance. csw  
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Figure 1.2: The hierarchy of low power embedded system design 
The available power reduction techniques are grouped and categorised as 
shown in Figure 1.2 .The base of the pyramid is the circuit and 
architectural level techniques which predominantly concentrate on the 
architecture to optimise power consumption. Popular techniques include 
Clock gating [3], [4], Power gating [5] and Dynamic Voltage and Frequency 
scaling [6]. DVFS is known for the ease with which it can be implemented 
and the effectiveness with which it is possible to achieve power reductions. 
More details of these techniques are discussed in chapter 2. 
The next level in the hierarchy is interconnecting optimisations, is also a 
well-researched area [7]. One reason for this is, a dominant portion of a 
processor power consumption is dependent on bus interconnect 
mechanism. To address this problem, intelligent bus encoding schemes can 
be used to scale down the toggling activity and efficient bus 
encoders/decoders can be used to reduce the bus swing and structure [7].  
Algorithmic optimisation involves efficient coding and the utilisation of 
available resources. Also, the effectiveness depends on the programmer 
knowledge and expertise in the software skills and the application domain.  
System level
Low power 
modes,  wake-up 
time
Algorithmic
Efficient implementation 
of software
Interconnect 
optimizations and 
peripheral components
Circuit and Architecture level
Clock gating, power gating, DVFS
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The highest level in the hierarchy is the system level techniques. The most 
popular techniques include the usage of low power modes, multiple clock 
sources, multiple regulators, and wake up time [8]. 
Power consumption at circuit and architectural level is considered as the 
main focus of this research work. As illustrated in Figure 1.2, the power 
consumption needs to be dealt with at each level of the hierarchy 
mentioned. However, the base of the hierarchy is the most important 
section to achieve low power as the higher levels of abstraction are built on 
it. It is identified that switching activity and operating voltage are the two 
most important factors that influence energy consumption and 
performance of the modern processors.  
1.3 Security 
Another focus of this research is the security of embedded systems. With 
increased use of portable devices and the new developments of IoT [9], the 
embedded system design metrics have been changed. Security of the 
systems is also becoming an important design metric to store and access 
sensitive information. Along with the performance and power constraints, 
security is also emerging as a design constraint [10].  
Mobile phones [11], PDAs [12], smartcards [13] and servers are all the best 
examples of embedded devices used for secure transactions such as 
banking, online shopping and payments. This is not limited to these 
applications but also the new development IoT demands the security of 
embedded systems as an important metric.  
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Figure 1.3 Internet of Things: number of connected devices worldwide from 
2012 to 2020 (in billions) [14] 
A recent survey reveals that the number of devices connected to the 
internet to transfer or exchange data has been increasing. Figure 1.3 depicts 
a forecast on the number of connected devices using internet of things 
(IoT) worldwide from 2012 to 2020 [14]. In 2017, the number of connected 
devices is 28.4 billion, which is predicted to be doubled by 2020. Similarly, 
smart device usage for secure transactions has also been increasing 
exponentially. This situation demands more security than ever before to 
avoid the attacks on these devices.  
In general, side-channel attacks [15] are the most commonly used and pose 
a major threat to embedded systems security. Since the attacks work on a 
fundamental principle that the computation is a physical process and all 
physical characteristics of a computation, leak the secure information used 
internally. The typical physical characteristics such as time, power 
consumption, and electromagnetic radiation reveal information about the 
internal computation. Furthermore, the attacks can be implemented with 
ease and commonly avilable equipment such as a computer and an 
oscilloscope. Power analysis is the most powerful and effective technique 
CONTENT REMOVED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
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to reveal the secret information used during the execution of cryptographic 
algorithms [17][16][18].   
According to Kocher [19], power analysis attacks are two types: simple 
power analysis attacks (SPA) [20] and Differential power analysis attacks 
(DPA) [21]. A Simple Power Analysis Attack (SPA) predicts the secret 
information by analysing the power traces visually. In power analysis, a 
trace is a collection of power measurements over a specified period. Power 
consumption of a device typically depends on the instruction being 
executed and data being processed. In a typical processor context, power 
varies with the addressing mode and the type instruction such as 
arithmetic, logic and Boolean. However, the prediction can be made wrong 
by using simple countermeasures such as random insertion of dummy 
code and avoiding memory usage [22].   
Differential power analysis attacks are a major concern to the embedded 
systems security. The attacks can be successful even without knowing 
much information about the system. The attack process is initiated by 
measuring the power consumption of the device followed by comparing it 
with the hypothetical power consumption and eventually extracting the 
secret information contained in a chip or system.  
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Figure 1.4: The hierarchy of embedded system security [9] 
Figure 1.4 shows the hierarchy of embedded system security. The base of 
the hierarchy needs to be strong to build an effective and secured 
embedded system.  Therefore, this issue is dealt at the circuit and 
architecture level. Dynamic voltage and frequency scaling technique can be 
used as a countermeasure to improve the robustness against power 
analysis attacks.  This work addresses the problems of using DVFS as a 
countermeasure and proposes a new technique, which effectively reduces 
the correlation between power consumption and the internal data being 
processed within the device. 
1.4 Summary of Contributions 
A novel technique based on aggressive voltage scaling has been proposed 
to address the issues of the main design constraints, power consumption 
and security. The proposed technique has an error detection capability 
without error correction timing penalty. As soon as the error is detected, 
the phase delayed clock is selected to capture the late arrival of data. The 
area overhead involved is small compared to the other latest techniques. In 
CONTENT REMOVED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
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addition to this, the present technique is quite attractive in all the design 
aspects. The summary of main contributions is:  
 Voltage scaling techniques have already been proposed as a 
countermeasure for power analysis attacks. The used aggressive voltage 
scaling involves large area overhead and error correction overhead. To 
solve the problem of hardware realization of aggressive voltage scaling, a 
new countermeasure to improve resistance of the circuits from power 
analysis attacks is proposed.  
 It is well known that DVFS technique is the most effective power reduction 
technique. To achieve more power savings, processors use aggressive 
scaling technique with error detection and correction circuitry to operate 
systems beyond the worst case estimates. The error detection and 
correction circuitry is used to detect any timing speculations in the circuit 
as frequency and voltage are scaled.  
 Practical  experiments have been carried out by prototyping the design on 
to an FPGA to validate the effectiveness of the technique in terms of power 
consumption and resistance to DPA attacks. 
 
1.5 Thesis Organization 
The organization of this thesis is as follows: 
Chapter 2 discusses the basic components of power consumption and the 
techniques at different levels of abstraction of systems design, particularly 
circuit and architectural level techniques. 
Chapter 3 covers the background of power analysis attacks and different 
countermeasures that can be used to improve resistance of the systems to 
differential power analysis attacks. 
11 
 
Chapter 4 presents the latest research of aggressive voltage/ frequency 
scaling techniques and the Matlab simulation of AVS system with a 
controller. 
Chapter 5 discusses the proposed technique covering the principle of 
operation, simulation results and the practical hardware implementation of 
the technique using FPGA. 
Chapter 6 is about the proposed technique as a countermeasure for 
differential power analysis attacks. 
Chapter 7 presents concluding remarks and future research work.  
 
1.6 Summary 
Different power saving and security related techniques are listed in this 
chapter ranging from architectural to application development. In addition 
to this, a summary of this research work contributions are discussed. 
Scientists have been coming up with new techniques and algorithms at 
different levels of system design but it seems inadequate. The field requires 
much more work to be done towards power reduction and security 
improvement and indeed it does require new methods and new ways of 
thinking to meet the industry demands. In the next chapter, the various 
low power system design techniques are discussed with an extra emphasis 
on the simple yet more effective technique, dynamic voltage and frequency 
scaling. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
Literature Review for Power Efficiency 
 
Low power system design requires reducing power consumption in all 
components and at all levels of the design process subject to constraints on 
the system performance and the quality of service [1]. In general, processor 
is the main power hungry device in an embedded system. Hence, this 
chapter provides a survey of processor based techniques that are used by 
semiconductor vendors to meet the market growing demands keeping 
power consumption as a constraint. Further, it presents a brief overview of 
the state of the art principles of circuit and architectural level techniques 
and emphasizes mainly on the most effective and efficient technique for 
power reduction, Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling (DVFS) 
technique. It highlights the various forms of DVFS architecture such as 
open loop DVFS and closed loop DVFS and their benefits. Some emerging 
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techniques on DVFS such as techniques based on software, hardware and 
controller are also discussed. 
To build a low power embedded system, the design issue must be dealt 
with at each level of abstraction of the system design cycle. The pyramid in 
chapter 1, Figure 1.2 shows different levels of abstraction. Though, the 
design issue need to be dealt with each level, but to have a strong pyramid, 
the base of it must very strong enough to handle the above layers. Hence, 
this research work has been concentrated on circuit and architectural level. 
2.1 Architectural and Circuit Level Design Level 
Techniques 
In this section, an overview of low power architectural and design level 
techniques are detailed and all these techniques are based on the principle 
discussed earlier, manipulation of operating voltage, frequency and 
leakage current. 
2.1.1 Clock Gating 
Clock signal consumes significant amount of power in digital systems 
because of the continuous toggling nature [23]. The sources of power 
consumption in a clock network are switching activity and switching 
capacitance. The objective of clock gating is disabling the clock whenever 
there is no activity. Hence switching activity can reproduced and thus 
power consumption can be optimized. A simple clock gating circuit is 
shown in Figure 2.1. Sequential clock-gating can provide major power 
savings by reducing toggling activity by 15-25% in logic block [3].  
Combinational clock-gating provides power reduction by about 5-10% [3].  
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Figure 2.1: A simple clock gating circuit 
2.1.2 Power Gating 
Similar to clock gating, power gating is also nothing but shutting down the 
unit when it is not in use. In power gating, the power supply need to be 
shut off or power down of the functional block when not in use. Sub-
threshold leakage and gate leakage both are reduced using this method [5]. 
Figure 2.2 shows a simple power gating circuit diagram. The functional 
block is connected to the supply using two switches, header switch and 
footer switch. When there is no activity to be performed, the sleep signal 
disconnects the functional block from the power supply and reduces the 
leakage current significantly. This technique is extensively useful to 
implement various low power modes in processors. 
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Figure 2.2: Power Gating  
2.1.3 Pipelining 
Pipelining is the technique used to improve instruction throughput. This 
method leads to a reduction in the critical path and thus effectively reduces 
switching capacitance to achieve low power consumption. In some cases 
the instructions need to be discarded, and it may lead to waste of energy if 
they are already fetched and partially processed. 
 
Figure 2.3: Pipelining circuit  
As can be seen in Figure 2.3, the main design element of a pipeline is 
deciding the number of registers to be used to realise the required stage. 
This information is dependent on the location of the pipeline stage. 
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Increasing the number of registers provide high throughput but consume 
more power. To achieve low power the number of registers must be 
reduced. Shimada et al. [24], proposed another technique called Pipeline 
Stage Unification (PSU). PSU uses the same principle as dynamic voltage 
and frequency scaling, modifies frequency and operating voltage on the 
fly. However, power reduction is attained by reducing the number of 
stages and consequently reducing the number of registers instead of 
reducing operating voltage. 
2.1.4 On-Chip Communication 
On-chip communication significantly contributes to low power 
consumption. A dominant portion of a chip’s power consumption is 
dependent on bus interconnect mechanism. Low power bus 
communication can be realised by scaling down the toggling activity 
through intelligent bus encoding schemes and designing bus 
encoders/decoders to reduce the bus swing and bus structures.  The power 
consumption in an interconnect mechanism is [25]: 
   
 
         
       (2-1) 
Where ΔV the voltage swing, Cw is the interconnect wire capacitance, fc is 
the clock frequency and α is the switching activity. From Equation (2-1), 
one way of reducing power is scaling down the switching activity on 
interconnects, and hence reducing the capacitance. This can be done by 
using bus encoding schemes. The encoding methods are applied 
depending on the kind of bus, architecture and the complexity of the 
encoder.   
As can be seen in the equation (2-1), interconnect power is directly 
proportional to the signal voltage swing. Hence reducing voltage swing 
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causes power reduction. One way of achieving this is using a low voltage 
differential signalling circuit, which acts as a level converter between the 
transmitter and receiver. The input signal voltage is reduced by splitting 
into two opposite polarities at the transmitter. The receiver sees the 
difference between the two transmitted signals and amplifies it back to 
normal voltage.  A simple schematic representing this scheme is shown in 
Figure 2.4.  
 
Figure 2.4: Low voltage differential signalling circuit [25] 
Traditionally, the bus is designed in such a way that the complete bus 
charges and discharges for every request. This method divides the bus into 
various blocks and these blocks are joined by a link that controls the traffic 
between adjacent blocks. To keep the bus in power down mode, the critical 
paths that connect links are initiated separately. The other best way is 
keeping the most often communicating blocks close to avoid extra 
infrastructure and to achieve power efficiency.  
The techniques discussed so far consider an architecture in which different 
blocks use one or more buses commonly. Sharing buses this way has 
impact on performance and power. The intrinsic bus bandwidth confines 
the capacity and speed of data transfers and not suitable for the varying 
requirements of various functional blocks. The main constraint of bus 
communication is accessing the bus, several can request for bus access but 
only one can access at any time. Hence the bus access always needs bus 
arbitration methods but they are power expensive. Unlike simple data 
CONTENT REMOVED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
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transfers, every bus transaction comprises multiple clock cycles of 
handshaking protocols that increase power and delay [26]. The only 
solution for this problem is a new technology that should substitute buses. 
Compared to buses, networks offer higher bandwidth and support 
concurrent connections [26]. The network based architecture helps to 
concentrate on power sensitive areas. Many networks have sophisticated 
mechanisms for adapting to varying trafﬁc patterns and quality-of-service 
requirements [26], [27].  
2.1.5 Voltage Scaling Techniques 
Scaling down the supply voltage provides significant power reduction 
because of the square factor in equation (1-3). Static voltage scaling and 
dynamic voltage scaling are the two techniques that are widely used to 
reduce the total power consumption of a device. 
2.1.5.1 Static voltage scaling 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Multiple supply voltage system [28] 
Multi-supply voltage approach is nothing but the static voltage scaling 
technique that operates different blocks at different voltages based on their 
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performance needs. The processor internal blocks such as ALU, memory 
and I/O are partitioned and provided supply voltages as shown in Figure 
2.5. Different voltage islands are identified at the design time and they are 
fixed for the entire chip operation. They have been used in most of the 
high-performance commercial chips, including the Intel processors with 
XScale technology and the Crusoe processor from Transmeta. For example, 
the Intel Pentium Processors use three power islands to connect to the 
processor core, memory and I/O units. Multi-voltage domains require 
enormous amounts of internal development effort in libraries, tools and 
methodologies.  However, this method significantly reduces dynamic 
power as well as static power since the operating voltage is getting lower.  
A level shifter is required in this design because there is a level difference 
between the two blocks. 
2.1.6 Dynamic voltage scaling 
Dynamic voltage scaling is the most commonly used technique, it sets the   
supply voltage according to the performance need. The technique is 
combined with dynamic frequency scaling to achieve significant power 
reduction. The main goal of the combined technique is to operate the 
processor at the lowest possible operating conditions while achieving the 
required performance levels. In other words, the fundamental idea of 
DVFS is tuning the supply voltage and frequency depending on the 
current task requirements. Reduction of supply voltage has a major impact 
on power consumption because power is linearly related to the square of 
the supply voltage. 
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Figure 2.6: Block diagram of open loop DVFS [16] 
Based on the architecture used, dynamic voltage and frequency scaling 
approach is divided into two categories: open-loop and closed-loop. Open-
loop DVFS is shown in Figure 2.6 and it is the most commonly used form 
of DVFS. Here, the operating voltage or nominal voltage is pre-determined 
for the target application and for the desired operating frequency based on 
a table of frequency/voltage pairs. The values in the table are pre-
determined by considering all operating conditions and process corners. 
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Figure 2.7: DVFS operational sequence [30] 
Figure 2.7 shows the sequence of operations performed to switchover 
between different operating conditions of DVFS. Depending on the 
application requirements, the processor decides the appropriate frequency 
and requests the voltage controller a new voltage by looking at the pre 
characterised frequency/voltage pair look-up tables. Next, the processor 
commands the power supply to switch to the selected voltage and waits 
for the new voltage to settle. The processor changes to the new frequency 
after voltage is stabilised. The Change can be done immediately when 
changing from a higher frequency to a lower frequency but not when 
switching from a lower frequency to a higher frequency. The reason for 
this requirement is the power supply voltage must be high enough to 
support the new frequency prior to changing the clock [30].  
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Figure 2.8: Block diagram of closed loop voltage scaling system [16] 
A typical block diagram of closed-loop voltage scaling is shown in Figure 
2.8 and this closed loop in nature provides better results over open loop 
DVS. The circuit monitors device temperature, process profile and report 
the information to an embedded controller called advance power controller 
(APC). Based on the profile information, the APC decides whether voltage 
optimisation is required or not and then sends a command to the external 
power management unit to change the voltage. The system continuously 
monitors system changes and adjusts the operating voltage accordingly. 
Better performance can be guaranteed with closed loop voltage scaling 
system as compared with the look up tables in open loop DVS. The closed 
loop system can respond much faster since it is limited only by the 
companion power supply. 
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Figure 2.9: Energy consumption of different voltage scaling schemes [29] 
As can be seen in Figure 2.9, closed loop system also known as adaptive 
voltage scaling provides more energy savings compared to dynamic 
voltage scaling and fixed voltage (no scaling techniques) schemes. 
 D. Ernst et al [31] proposed the first ever AVS system known as Razor. The 
AVS system adjusts the supply voltage adaptively and detects if the 
voltage reduction exceeds the limits. This error detection is notified by the 
special flip flops equipped with the error detection logic. Once detected, 
the error must be corrected by computing the failed operation at a lower 
clock rate. 
2.2 Problems of DVFS Technique 
There are many techniques and approaches at this level of system design 
hierarchy. Dynamic voltage and frequency scaling is the most promising 
technique to achieve optimal performance while providing energy savings.  
This technique is the industry approved and the most dominant research 
area. However, the technique needs to be extended or upgraded further to 
suit the modern processor performance and power demands. In order to 
meet the present requirements, the technique needs to be modified without 
losing its intended features.  Using this technique, the commercial 
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processors offer several operating modes. In low power mode, the 
processor performs simple operations and consumes less power. Similarly, 
in high performance mode, the processor computes the task at high speeds 
to meet the deadline. The DVFS software switches between different 
modes depending on the task requirements. All the operating modes are 
pre calculated by considering the application and PVT variations.    
As discussed earlier, the hardware realization of traditional approach uses 
open loop system. The system pre-determines different voltage and 
frequency pairs and stores them in a look-up table.  Since the values are 
pre-determined, the system is not able to adapt to the changing needs of 
the modern processor needs. Another approach is adaptive or closed loop 
system. The controller monitors the application requirements and decides 
which level is appropriate. However, the technique is not able to fully 
realise the benefit to provide ultra-power savings due to the excess timing 
margins. To summarize, the issues of the traditional DVFS are: 1) due to its 
pre-calculated operating points, the system is not able to suit modern 
process variations; 2) since PVT variations are not considered, large timing 
margins are added to guarantee a safe operation in the presence of 
variations. 
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Figure 2.10: Voltage- frequency graph for DVFS and AVS or AFS 
Latest research addresses the issues of DVFS using Aggressive scaling 
technique (AVS), which is the most recent emerging extension to DVFS. It 
addresses the needs of power optimization very effectively. This technique 
pushes the walls of the operating region, to the limit,  to achieve the 
required power savings and the main concept of this technique is to go 
beyond the worst case estimates of voltage and frequency. To have a better 
understanding, different pairs of (v, f) under DVFS and AVS approach are 
illustrated in Figure 2.10. As a result of DVFS, all the pairs lie on the linear 
curve and falls in the operating zone of a typical processor. The pairs can 
deviate from the linear curve using AVS or AFS.  For example, at each 
operating point, in the case of aggressive voltage scaling, the regular set of 
values (v1, f1) changes to a new set of values (v11 = v1+∆v, f) and if voltage 
changes to (v+∆v), it enters into the operating zone aiming high 
performance.  If voltage changes to (v-∆v), it enters into the non-operating 
zone aiming to reduce power consumption.  
Non-operating zone  
 Operating Zone 
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As a result of AVS entering into non-operating zone, it can cause problems 
*with device handing and functional correctness of the processor. 
Generally to address these issues, semiconductor manufacturers fabricate 
devices (ICs) by considering worst case scenario and provide some 
tolerance. As the occurrence of the worst case is very rare, the devices can 
relax the extra margins to attain maximum performance or power savings. 
To ensure the correct functionality of the device, critical path must be 
monitored in aggressive scaling techniques. In general, the critical path of 
the design decides the minimum time period or maximum clock 
frequency. In order to provide functional correctness, the behaviour of the 
critical path need to be monitored as voltage or frequency is scaled. The 
variation of voltage and frequency causes either clock frequency faster or 
slower with respect to the input data arrival. The misalignment of data 
with respect to the clock edge causes timing error and causes malfunction. 
To address this issue, the timing error detection and correction circuits are 
employed to successfully detect and correct the timing errors. 
 
2.3 Latest Research on DVFS Technique 
In general, the latest research trends can be identified as having three main 
paths; 
• Techniques for optimising the overheads involved to implement 
hardware DVFS  
• Techniques for improving the decision making on task 
scheduling to provide optimised power or performance  
• Techniques for providing fast response time on power supplies 
and controllers to switch over between different modes. 
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For all paths, the common goal is to trade off performance and power 
consumption by manipulating voltage and frequency. In other words, all 
the techniques rely on the fundamental principle of CMOS devices that the 
dynamic power consumption is directly related to the square of the supply 
voltage and operating frequency. Using DVFS technology, the industry 
standards such as Intel SpeedStep [32] and AMD PowerNow [33], achieve 
the trade-off between power and performance. 
 
Various disparate parameters related to maximum performance, area 
overhead, power overhead and response time of DVFS technique have 
been analysed and optimised.  The research on hardware includes the 
possible number of states and on all the individual components of the 
DVFS technique. The research on software describes different techniques to 
integrate the end user requirements to the available hardware. This 
includes task scheduling, power management algorithms, etc. The research 
on control techniques includes fast response time of power supply units, 
adaptive power supply and an effective controller.  
 
2.3.1 Techniques based on controller 
As a mechanism to support voltage scaling in all modern processors or 
systems, several power supply designs have been proposed to provide the 
required levels of voltages. As briefly introduced, many power supplies 
are available; fixed voltage power supply, on-chip multiple or adaptive 
power supplies. Essentially, the power supply must be able to provide 
different functional blocks with different voltage levels simultaneously or 
different voltage levels required to be operated the system in different 
operating modes. 
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In [34], [35], different adaptive power supply designs are presented to 
provide fast transient response to reduce the losses and latency incurred to 
switch between different operating modes. A slightly different approach, 
with complete digital-controller architecture in a closed-loop with a DC-
DC switching converter is presented in [36].  Another important challenge 
for the controllers is to predict the workload variation to optimally choose 
the corresponding parameters.  The efficiency of the controllers depends 
on the accuracy of the workload prediction or estimation. An efficient 
controller based on fuzzy logic is proposed in [37] to accurately estimate 
the workload to tune the supply voltage and frequency to match the task 
requirements. An on-chip critical path emulator architecture is presented 
in [38], which tracks the changing critical path in the design. The authors 
claim that the architecture is up to 43% and 23% more energy efficient 
compared to open loop and closed loop systems respectively. Another 
DVFS control mechanism is proposed in [39], where a voltage over-
shoot/undershoot is introduced in order to accelerate the transition from 
one voltage level to another. The authors claim a gain of 30% in the 
transition time of the applied voltage. A different approach is presented in 
[40]  as standalone chip with a DC-DC regulator and voltage controlled 
oscillator (VCO). The whole mechanism works on the reference clock 
frequency, an error signal is generated that controls the regulator through 
a digital loop filter. 
Recently [41],[42], proposed a joint control of voltage and frequency 
actuators which are designed independently. The approach controls the 
transition from one operating point to another, optimizing the intermediate 
path between the states. 
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2.3.2 Techniques based on software 
Scheduling is the most important step in DVFS to trade-off power and 
performance in multi-processor systems. The combination of DVFS and 
scheduling of the tasks provide an effective resource utilization and power 
optimization. During the process, scheduling involves assigning the tasks 
in the task set on a multi-processor or high performance processor system 
by attempting to maximize objective function while meeting the deadline 
constraint [43]. The next phase in the process involves the output of the 
earlier phase is processed in such a way that the task performs with in the 
tight deadlines while achieving energy reduction using DVFS technique. In 
[44], proposed an effective scheduling technique, which maps each task to 
one of the voltage and frequency pair (v,f) from the available set of discrete 
pairs using DVFS. Another similar technique with slight modification to 
the DVFS architecture is proposed in [43]. This technique works on 
multiple voltage–frequency selection (MVFS) instead of single value to 
achieve more energy reductions. The author also claims that with their 
MVFS-DVFS, energy consumption is pushed near the optimal point of 
using (v, f) pairs supported by tradition DVFS schemes. 
 
2.3.3 Techniques based on hardware 
The techniques aim at hardware level mainly comprises of pushing the 
optimal operating points further to have more number of (v, f) pairs and to 
reduce power consumption. Hence the techniques employ a special 
hardware circuit to detect any timing violations. Various techniques have 
been proposed under this approach [43], [46]. These techniques are 
discussed in detail further in the coming chapters to provide the 
background for this research with details of the research aims and 
objectives. On the other hand, as the technology is shrinking, the supply 
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voltage scaling requires a reduction in the threshold voltage, as a result of 
this, the leakage current increases exponentially with each new technology 
generation. As in [21], the combination of adaptive body bias and DVFS 
can be used to reduce the leakage current and thus the total power 
consumption of modern processor systems. 
 
2.4  Summary 
The literature survey is conducted in three major areas in the scope of this 
research. They are a) circuit and architectural techniques of using 
manipulation of supply voltage, operating frequency and leakage current 
for power optimization; b) the low overhead and industry approved 
technique: dynamic voltage and frequency scaling methods suitable for 
modern processor designs c) latest research on DVFS software, hardware 
and controller. The survey has shown that the research theme of power 
optimization of embedded systems has taken different areas and 
optimization approaches.  Some methods were proposed on adaptive 
power supply to provide fast transient response during the switchover of 
the operating modes. Only a few studies used the aggressive voltage 
scaling in their power optimization techniques as trigger, but not 
necessarily with the intention of improving security of the systems from 
DPA attacks, which is discussed later in subsequent chapters. Due to 
primitive and non-optimal operating points, traditional DVFS could not 
reap the full benefits of the technique in terms of power optimization. This 
called for more studies on DVFS technique to further exploit the excessive 
timing margins used to determine the optimal operating points. In order to 
develop a power efficient and secure system and to perform a comparative 
analysis on timing error detection and control, a complete aggressive 
scaling based system simulation model and the evaluation of the proposed 
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techniques on hardware platform is also required. The rest of the thesis 
attempts at providing some solutions to the problems identified here. 
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CHAPTER 3  
 
Commercial Low Power Systems and Techniques 
 
Considering complex and low power commercial processors give better 
idea of how power and performance has been taken care by the industry 
and what techniques have been employed for the purpose. This chapter 
highlights the features of the most powerful and widely used processors 
for mobile applications; Texas Instruments Application processors - 
OMAP35x and Samsung low power 32 bit RISC microprocessor - 
S3C2410X. Further, an overview of system level power reduction 
techniques is presented by considering commercial microcontrollers. Also, 
some emerging technologies along with the power management 
technologies used by industry are provided. 
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3.1 Texas Instruments Application Processors - OMAP35x 
The OMAP35X device includes state of the art power-management 
techniques required for high-performance mobile products. As seen in 
Figure 3.1, this device contains Microprocessor unit (MPU) based on the 
ARM Cortex A8 microprocessor, digital signal processor (DSP) core, 
integrated Camera image signal processor, Display subsystem and level 3 
(L3) and level 4 (L4) interconnects that provide high-bandwidth data 
transfers to the internal and external memory controllers and to on-chip 
peripherals [45]. 
As discussed earlier, the dynamic and static power together represent the 
total energy consumption of a device. Texas Instrument’s OMAP35x 
processor optimises system power consumption by employing the active 
power consumption techniques such as dynamic voltage and frequency 
scaling, adaptive voltage scaling, dynamic power switching and the static 
power consumption techniques such as power gating.  
The OMAP35x contains different voltage, clock and power domains. The 
partition of these domains in the chip is achieved by employing the most 
commonly used techniques such as clock gating and power gating. Each 
voltage domain has several power domains, and voltage distribution is 
subdivided further in these power domains. The power domains 
enable/disable power or switch into a low leakage retention mode and this 
can be done using software.  
DVFS helps to achieve the performance requirements of the application by 
reducing voltage and frequency. These hardware capabilities are combined 
with software to define Operating Performance Points (OPPs), which are 
typical combinations of clock frequencies and voltage levels. Predeﬁned 
operating performance points for the OMAP35 can be seen in Figure 3.2.  
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Figure 3.1: OMAP35X functional block diagram [45] 
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When system needs high performance, clock the ARM at 650 MHz, DSP at 
400 MHz, and voltage to 1.35V. In the case of low performance, define an 
OPP with ARM at 125, DSP at 90 MHz clocks and 0.95V. These settings can 
be varied by using software controlled registers.  
 
Figure 3.2: Predefined OPPs for the OMAP35x [47]  
Another active power management technique is adaptive voltage scaling, 
which monitors temperature, process performance and changes supply 
voltage dynamically. In OMAP, this technique has been implemented with 
a dedicated on-chip Smart Reﬂex technology based hardware. This circuit 
has a feedback loop and runs without processor involvement and changes 
voltage levels adaptively by considering temperature, process variations 
and silicon degradation. Once the operating performance point for the 
application has been decided, the algorithm sends signal   to the external 
regulator over I2C bus for the new voltage and requests clock generator for 
the new frequency. The combination of both dynamic voltage and 
frequency scaling and adaptive voltage scaling techniques provide better 
results to achieve power efficiency in OMAP devices. 
DPS is the other method of active power management used in OMAP35x, 
which determines idle parts of a device and keeps them into a power down 
mode. However this technique keeps only a section of an OMAP35x in a 
low power state, but in some cases it is more effective to keep the entire 
device in low power mode either automatically or by request. The 
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mechanism is developed in OMAP using a mechanism called static leakage 
management (SLM). Generally, Processors contains several low power 
modes from standby to deep sleep mode to consume very little power but 
wake up time always consume more power and time. Using this method 
makes OMAP device wake up time faster because the content is loaded in 
external memory and no need to wait for the full operating system restart.  
To reduce power, it is imperative to make the best use of low power modes 
and consider the best wake up logic. Because wake up domain and I/O 
leakage are the main sources of power consumption. In OMAP devices, the 
lowest power mode is the device off mode where the device can wake up 
independently. All the other domains are off except the wake up logic. This 
domain can use the slowest 32 kHz clock in case the main clock is switched 
off. In order to provide more power savings, all the modules are internally 
switched off as there is no need to retain any information. However, The 
OMAP35x can communicate to external regulators if the situation requests, 
even in this low power mode. The current state of the system is loaded in 
external memory before the device enters this mode.  As soon as the wake 
up request is received, the processor jumps to a user deﬁned function. 
 
3.2 Samsung Low Power 32bit RISC Microprocessor - 
S3C2410X 
The S3C2410X was developed using an ARM920T core, 0.18um CMOS 
standard cells and a memory compiler [48]. The block diagram of this 
device is shown in Figure 3.3. Its low-power, simple, elegant and fully 
static design is particularly suitable for cost- and power-sensitive 
applications. It adopts a new bus architecture called Advanced 
Microcontroller Bus Architecture (AMBA) [48]. Peripherals like Universal 
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Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART) interface and USB are 
included by way of the on chip AMBA Peripherals Bus (APB). 
 
 
Figure 3.3: S3C2410X Device Functional Block diagram [48] 
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The processor supports four low power modes: Normal, Slow, Idle, and 
Power-off mode. Different power domains are designed with power gating 
technique in this chip to power off certain modules when they are not in 
use. The processor uses power management controller (PMC), to manage 
the chip’s clock, reset and power supply and to control the processor to 
shift among different power modes. In addition to this, clock gating might 
be useful to reduce the dynamic power consumption of the digital unit by 
providing the clock signal to the digital unit whenever required. To reduce 
static power, power gating technique can also be used. The non-used 
blocks are powered off through power gates.  
3.3  System Level Design Techniques 
The microcontroller vendors use almost all the above mentioned 
techniques to provide the user a low-cost, low-power and high-
performance device. The techniques to build low power embedded 
systems using these devices are discussed in this section. As with any 
engineering-oriented discipline, domain expertise stands as an essential 
prerequisite for leveraging low power technology. Knowing your 
application domain is a key to knowing which power reduction technique 
will be effective. With the domain knowledge for the application and 
having reviewed VLSI techniques, its time move on to the stage of 
discussing power optimisation techniques available in commercial 
microcontroller units.  
3.3.1  Low power modes 
Most microcontrollers feature various low power modes ranging from 
standby to deep sleep to provide better power optimisations. There is no 
point in selecting the most powerful and low power device if it is not used 
effectively. The key thing here is considering all available modes by 
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keeping the application in mind. Consequently, to develop a low power 
system, the lowest operating voltage and frequency must be selected to 
meet the real time goals. 
For example, the lowest power mode is sleep mode in PIC18 
microcontrollers. In this mode the device stops functioning and disables all 
clocks except for the wake up logic. In addition to this mode, the device 
contains some more low power modes as shown in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: Selected operative modes of PIC18F2420  
Mode Frequency 
Minimum 
VDO (V) 
Operating 
Current 
(µA) 
High Speed 20 MHz 5.0 2500 
Primary Run 1 MHz 2.0 125 
Low Power 32 kHz 2.0 10 
Sleep - 2.0 1.5 
 
Depending on the application requirements, the appropriate mode and the 
extra logic for switching from low power mode to normal mode of 
operation need to be considered. Task scheduling algorithms provide 
better power savings along with switching overhead and application 
deadlines.  
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3.3.2 Multiple clock sources and switching 
Most modern microcontrollers are coming up with a new feature of having 
multiple clock sources and changing them on the fly to reduce power 
consumption. The advantage of this feature is that the user has flexibility 
over deciding the clock frequency and the clock source by keeping the 
application demands and power in mind. 
Kristjansson [49] stated different ways of reducing power consumption 
using this feature in ARM7 core.  When the processor in standby mode, 
Real time clock can be used to wake the device to active mode. Instead of 
using internal PCLK, an external 32 kHz clock to keep RTC active in stanby 
mode provides better savings. Another advantage mentioned in [49] is 
optimising code execution and power consumption by changing the clock 
switching on the fly. The author also hypothesized that “Mixing clock 
sources, a PLL, a divider and clock enable/disable provides a very flexible 
architecture for power management.” 
3.3.3 Multiple regulators 
Power optimisation in low power modes is possible by using multiple 
dedicated on-chip low-power regulators as add-ons in its architecture [49]. 
The low power regulator can be used to maintain real time clock and 32 
kHz oscillator in standby mode. Using the low power regulator instead of 
the main regulator allows power consumption to be reduced in standby 
mode.  
3.3.4 Wake-up energy 
The wake-up time and wake-up source are important parameters that 
contribute to the overall MCU power consumption. Wake-up time is the 
time processor takes to come out of a sleep mode and it is very important 
for systems with short active times because the wake up process consumes 
42 
 
the same amount of current as the normal process does. The main 
component of wake-up time is the Oscillator start up time. 
The proper selection of wake-up sources is another important factor to 
reduce power consumption during wake-up process. Modern devices have 
extensive variety of wake-up sources and can wake up from almost any 
peripheral module on the device.  
Almost all microcontrollers have come up with a new feature, which 
allows a system to use a slow start-up source with a fast wake-up time. For 
Example, In PIC MCUs, Two-Speed Start-up initially wakes up from the 
internal RC oscillator, which typically starts up in a few milliseconds. To 
take advantage of this feature, the processor uses this oscillator until the 
primary clock source stabilises, reducing total time by executing any code 
that is not timing critical.  
3.3.5 Flash vs. RAM 
Running a program or moving a data from external memory will always 
consume more power than using on chip memory. However, it may not be 
possible to fit everything on chip, in that case, the program should ideally 
be created in such a way that many intensive routines should use on chip 
memory as much as possible. Furthermore, when using on chip memory, 
accessing Flash consumes more power than SRAMs [50]. To benefit from 
this feature, many devices offer an option to execute program from RAM 
to reduce power consumption.  
To execute from RAM, the code must be copied from Flash to RAM and 
this task requires major time and power. To make this task worthwhile, 
computationally intensive routines must be copied into RAM. The main 
drawback of this method is, some devices can reduce performance due to 
the restrictions of using a single memory bus for execution and operation. 
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For example, the Harvard architecture used in PIC32 devices, generally 
uses one memory bus to read from Flash and another to read from RAM. 
This consents the device to run at high speed without processor 
intervention. However, when operating from RAM, only a single memory 
bus is used, which can force the processor to stall during some instructions 
when writing to RAM. 
3.4 Available Technologies 
3.4.1 Advanced microcontroller bus architecture  
The Advanced Microcontroller Bus Architecture was introduced by ARM 
to use as on-chip bus in SoC designs. The first AMBA buses were 
Advanced System Bus (ASB) and Advanced Peripheral Bus (APB). The 
APB comes with a low power peripheral and is mainly proposed for 
connecting simple peripherals. The APB can be sometimes optimised for 
reduced interface complexity and minimal power consumption for 
supporting peripheral functions [50]. The bus can be used with any version 
of the system bus. Two or more peripheral buses may be used so as to 
optimise the clock on each bus based on what kind of tasks the peripherals 
are performing. The typical Bus architecture is shown in Figure 3.4, where 
the computational intensive peripherals are one side of the bus and less 
intensive peripherals such as timers are on the others side of the bus. This 
arrangement allows to disable the clock on timer side and wait for a serial 
communication to wake up the processor. In addition to this, multiple 
peripherals can be disabled using a single instruction by enabling and 
disabling the clock independently. A function of APB divider is to allow 
power savings when an application does not require any peripherals to run 
at the full processor rate [50]. 
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Figure 3.4: ARM Bus Architecture [50] 
The AMBA High-performance Bus (AHB) was added in AMBA version 2. 
ARM architectures with AMBA are profited immensely in terms of power 
management. The AHB is a single clock edge protocol and uses a full 
duplex parallel communication whereas the APB uses massive memory-
I/O accesses.  The AHB in combination with advanced low power bus 
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encoding techniques largely reduces the power requirement for memory 
accesses to the caches in ARM11 and highly advanced ARM Cortex cores 
[50]. 
3.4.2 Intelligent Energy Management (IEM) 
The concept of IEM technology uses the most effective power management 
technique called dynamic voltage and frequency scaling to achieve more 
power savings. The block diagram of IEM technology is shown in Figure 
3.5. The IEM software monitors the system workload continuously and 
generates a performance request based on the application requirements. 
Then IEM hardware adjusts the operating voltage and frequency of the 
processor accordingly. To use IEM, processor must be implemented with 
appropriate register slices and an Intelligent Energy Controller (IEC). 
 
Figure 3.5: IEM Technology [51] 
The effects of IEM and DVFS are evaluated by David et.al [52]. The study 
was done by considering three tasks and no activity in between the tasks. 
They considered two scenarios to evaluate the performance of the IEM. In 
the first case, they run the tasks by the ARM core at maximum frequency 
without using IEM. As soon as the task is completed, the core enters sleep 
mode. The main overhead in this is switching in and out of idle mode 
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because it consumes considerable power. The other scenario is using IEM 
and running the task with application requirements and avoiding idle 
time. They have been practically verified that IEM provides significant 
power reductions. Thus IEM intelligently manages performance and 
power by varying the frequency and operating voltage on the fly. 
ARM and National Semiconductor have come up with new solutions to 
extend the battery life of mobile devices.  This technology can be used to 
match the varying performance needs of the application by using dynamic 
voltage scaling and adaptive voltage scaling along with IEM. 
The system architecture of this design contains IEM with Adaptive Power 
Control and AMBA peripheral bus. The AMBA bus connects to the 
processor through the intelligent energy manager. Based on the system 
workload and requirements, the IEM software generates a request to 
modify the operating voltage and frequency. Using either open loop or 
closed loop, the adaptive power control block changes the voltage without 
disturbing the processor. The APC block provides a quick response but 
also assures the system operates with minimum safe operating voltage. 
3.5 Emerging Technologies 
3.5.1 Cloud computing 
As embedded systems are widely used in various fields, the demand for 
cloud computing in embedded systems may increase exponentially. This is 
another approach to reduce the energy consumption of embedded systems. 
These systems move computation tasks to remote computing facilities. 
This can be achieved by renting virtual machines from cloud providers or 
data centres. The energy constrained embedded system simply works as a 
terminal, and virtual machines in the remote cloud provider are rented to 
actually execute tasks. In this case, the embedded system, as a terminal, 
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does not require a significant amount of energy. And a number of virtual 
machines can be rented based on the computational demand of tasks.  
3.5.2 Resonant clock meshes 
For digital circuits, clock signal is the main essential signal to perform 
operations and synchronises all events. Because the clock is the main heart 
of any embedded system, the signal must be created in such a way that it 
must not contain any jitter and skew. The clock signal is distributed 
around the chip using the most traditional approach called clock tree. The 
disadvantage of this method is the presence of clock skew and it is solved 
by using clock mesh approach. This method minimises skew but consumes 
more power than a clock tree. The power consumption of a processor due 
to its clock network vary depending on the distribution scheme used. To 
overcome this problem, Cyclos have come up with a new solution to 
reduce CPU power consumption significantly [53]. 
The Cyclos developed a tank circuit, which is a combination of an inductor 
and capacitor connected in parallel to a power source as shown in Figure 
3.6. The operation of the circuit is similar to a mechanical pendulum. As 
can be seen in the Figure 3.6, current flows from a charged capacitor to an 
inductor and creates a magnetic field around the inductor. This process 
continues till the voltage across the capacitor reaches zero. The current 
continues to flow due to the energy provided by the magnetic field around 
the inductor and charges the capacitor with opposite polarity. This begins 
the cycle with opposite flow of current as when the cycle started. Thus the 
circuit provides continuous swinging with minimal energy compared to 
the tradition methods.  Cyclos states that this design reportedly cuts clock 
distribution power by up to 24% while maintaining the low clock-skew 
target required by high-performance processors. Cyclos claims that using 
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its technology can cut total IC power by up to 10%. AMD used this 
technology in their Trinity processor to push above 4GHz speed [53]. 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Parallel LC Tank Circuit [53] 
3.6 Summary 
In this chapter, Different system level power saving techniques have been 
discussed. In addition to this, industry power management technologies 
and low power processors are presented.  The power management 
technologies such as advanced microcontroller bus architecture and 
intelligent energy management are covered in this chapter. This provides a 
basis to understand the concepts of low power and to address the issues of 
power efficiency. In the next chapter, the concepts and theory behind the 
latest power saving technique, aggressive scaling, is discussed in detail.   
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CHAPTER 4  
 
Simulation of Aggressive Scaling System for Power 
Efficiency 
 
In this chapter, the idea and the principle behind the aggressive scaling 
mechanisms is presented. It also provides the latest available research, 
which is categorised into three types based on their hardware realization. It 
covers the details and principle of operation for each category and their 
drawbacks which provide the background for this research work. In order 
to investigate the power savings, a simulation study of the aggressive 
scaling system is carried out as a whole system with integrated 
components such as controller, buck converter and critical path delay 
monitor. The procedure to find the optimal operating conditions based on 
the feedback information received from processor is demonstrated.  The 
maximum frequency selection is primarily done by the application 
requirements, mainly on the critical path of the design. From this, a set of 
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worst-case operating conditions are declared, under which the system has 
to operate correctly. The design specifications used for the simulation are 
stated and the results obtained are presented in this chapter. 
The operating voltage and frequency of processor or electronic systems 
work at a lower rate than the typical operating conditions. The supply 
voltage and frequency are padded with extra margins to operate the 
system correctly at the worst- case condition.  This is to provide a safe and 
reliable operation, although the system and its components are verified for 
the worst case conditions such as operating and manufacturing variations. 
In general, typical worst-case manufacturing scenarios such as doping 
concentration variation, cross coupling noise etc. and sudden variations in 
operating conditions such as unexpected voltage drops, temperature 
fluctuations can have an impact on the design performance. Moreover, the 
data being processed and applied to the system creates variation in delay. 
To account for these variations and to ensure correct operation, systems are 
padded with extra margins. Occurrence of these worst-case situations may 
be very rare or impossible with the advanced process scaling technologies 
[54]. These margins result in extra overheads such as power or 
performance loss. To overcome the problem of excessive margins recent 
research works propose aggressive scaling mechanisms. They work 
beyond the worst case estimates by reducing excess margins to achieve 
maximum power savings. 
4.1 Aggressive Scaling 
Aggressive scaling mechanisms work on the principle that exploits the 
excess timing margin by placing an in-situ error detection and correction 
circuitry in the critical path of the design. The error detection and 
correction circuits monitor the critical path behaviour as the variations 
occur. As a mechanism to support voltage or frequency scaling beyond 
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sub-threshold region in all types of embedded systems, several studies 
have been published by enlisting various aggressive scaling technologies 
to perform stable and reliable operation [31], [55][60]. Based on their 
hardware realization, the aggressive scaling techniques are divided into 
three categories, direct monitoring [31], 54, [59]-[61], indirect monitoring 
[55][56] and time borrowing [57], [62]. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Razor flip-flop functional block diagram [31] 
 
4.1.1 Direct monitoring 
One of the earliest studies on direct monitoring approach to obtain 
maximum power savings was published by Ernest et al. in 2003 [31]. This 
study was conducted to scale the supply voltage as low as possible while 
providing reliable operation. In order to provide a stable operation, an in-
situ timing monitor was used to monitor the actual circuit delay variations 
in order to scale the supply voltage. The Razor technique functional block 
diagram is shown in Figure 4.1.  With this technique, the supply voltage is 
tuned beyond the typical voltage level to gain better power savings. The 
circuit double samples the input data with main clock and delayed clock. 
The outputs of these two sequential elements are compared to detect any 
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timing violations. The detected error is fixed by capturing the correct data 
from the latch instead of the flip-flop. In this way, the circuit self-tunes 
supply voltage by monitoring timing errors. The simulations and the detail 
understanding of timing errors with respect to the supply voltage can be 
found in [31]. Original flip-flops are replaced with these special flip-flops 
of the critical path to detect any timing violations  
The major problem with flip-flop based design is meta-stability. The input 
data of the flip-flop can vary any time before set-up time, and then the flip-
flop enters into meta-stable state. This can cause unpredicted behaviour of 
the circuit. To overcome this situation, razor used meta-stability detector in 
the flip-flop circuit. The power overhead incurred by using error detection 
circuit is minimal during error–free operation. Further, the power gain 
overcomes the power overhead incurred. Razor technique also included to 
address all different kinds of variations. 
Various updates and extensions to the original razor technique have been 
proposed. Razor II [54] proposed to overcome the drawbacks of razor 
correction mechanism. In [59], [60], Bubble razor uses two latch based 
architecture to overcome the drawbacks of Razor technique. On the other 
hand, the practical implementation of Razor technique has been studied to 
evaluate the ease of the architecture to integrate with the application. The 
integration of Razor technique with ARM processor architecture is studied 
in [61]. Similarly the integration of razor technique into an FPGA based 
design is proposed and studied in [63].  
4.1.2 Indirect monitoring 
The Timing-Error-Avoidance prototype, TEAtime [55] indirectly monitors 
the critical path behaviour as the voltage and frequency are scaled until the 
timing violations occur. The system predicts the timing errors using critical 
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path replica, which is made up of delay chains, instead of the original 
critical path. The conceptual diagram of TEAtime is shown in Figure 4.2. 
The replica co-exists along with the original design. Therefore, the 
advantage of this method is that the original design need not be changed to 
implement this circuit. Only the critical path in the design is replicated to 
predict the error before it actually happens. The tracking logic in the 
architecture is the critical path replica with added safety margin. Input to 
this block is a toggle flip-flop, which changes from 0 to 1 and 1 to 0 on 
alternate cycles. This ensures that the signal tests both types of 
transmission [56]. The output passed through an XOR gate to the timing 
checker unit, which decides whether clock frequency need to be increased 
or not. The timing checker output signal controls the counting direction of 
the up-down counter and DAC coverts the counter output to an analogue 
voltage signal.  This signal sets the clock frequency by controlling the 
voltage-controlled oscillator, and the VCO output becomes the system 
clock, completing the feedback loop as shown in Figure 4.2. The process 
makes sure that the clock period will never be less than the delay through 
the tracking logic plus the safety margin delay. This situation ensures that 
no timing error will occur in the real logic, which ensures correct system 
operation. The most common digital system issues are meta-stability and 
multiple worst case paths. Both the issues are addressed with slight 
changes to the original design. To incorporate TEAtime into the design, the 
architecture of the design need to be modified. However, since the critical 
path replica coexists in the design, there is no need to alter the critical path. 
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Figure 4.2: TEAtime: A canary circuits based approach [55] 
 
4.1.3 Time–borrowing 
This technique masks the timing error by borrowing time from the next 
following stages. Timber [57] is the best example for this category. Timber 
proposed two types of elements in the architecture; timber flip-flop and 
latch. Flip-flops generally capture data with respect to the positive or 
negative edge of the clock. Time borrowing in flip-flop is achieved by 
further extending the sampling edge to capture the late arrival of data 
caused by dynamic variations. The checking period is the period used to 
detect timing errors. In this case, the entire checking period is divided into 
two types: time-borrowing (TB) and error detection (ED) as shown in 
Figure 4.4. If single stage error occurs, the period is extended further to 1 
TB unit. If two stage error occurs, the period extends to 2 units.  Thus, flip-
flop borrows time from next stages to recover from error. The TIMBER flip-
flop clock control logic is shown in Figure 4.3. EN is the enable signal, 
which indicates time-borrowing is turned on or off. In case of time-
borrowing, the signal must be set to zero. CK is the clock signal used to 
capture the data of all the sequential elements in the circuit. The three 
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intervals in the checking period are encoded using select input signals S0 
and S1.  If the two signals are 00, that indicates TB interval, and 01, 10 
specifies ED intervals. DCK is the delayed clock signal, which is used to 
late arrival data. To avoid the meta-stability problem of flip-flop, in 
TIMBER, proposed latch configuration. The positive duration of the clock 
can be used as checking period because it is a level-sensitive sequential 
element. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: TIMBER flip-flop clock control [57] 
 
 
Figure 4.4: TIMBER based error detection and masking [57] 
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4.2 A Complete Aggressive Voltage Scaling System:  
Simulation Study 
The simulation of the complete system with aggressive scaling is shown in 
this section using Matlab and Simulink. With the available resources in 
Matlab, the simulations are carried out to investigate the power saving 
offered by the aggressive scaling schemes.   
Figure 4.5 shows the block diagram of the entire AVS system with timing 
speculation. The individual blocks are created using the libraries available 
in Matlab/Simulink software. The controller gets the information about 
timing margin from the delay monitoring unit (DMU) and decides whether 
voltage should be increased or decreased. In general, several critical path 
replicas and monitoring units are inserted around the real critical paths to 
detect timing predictions. The monitoring unit outputs potential error 
before the real timing error occurs. The controller makes the decision by 
analyzing error rate with the pre-defined minimum timing margin. If the 
error rate is less than the margin, the controller raises the supply voltage 
but makes sure that there exists plenty of margin to tolerate noise 
fluctuations. When the timing margin increases the threshold value, the 
controller scales down the supply voltage to maintain minimum power 
dissipation. Only one delay monitor unit is considered in this work to 
make the simulation of the whole AVS mechanism effective. Therefore the 
controller decides one of the actions mentioned above and gives the 
command to the voltage actuator to adjust the supply voltage of the 
processor core based on the timing margin signals T1 and T0.  
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Figure 4.5: Block diagram of the whole aggressive scaling system 
 
4.2.1 Voltage actuator 
DC/DC converters are found to be the best solution in AVS enabled 
systems. Recently digital controlled DC/DC converter has drawn wide 
attention due to its fast response, low power consumption and 
compatibility with CMOS processes [64]. Many existing digital controllers 
use high resolution and high speed analogue to digital (A/D) converter to 
sample and convert the regulated output voltage into digital signal in 
feedback loop to determine the duty ratio of the DC/DC converter. Its 
bandwidth limits the overall dynamic response of the converter.  
In general, switching power supplies employ pulse width modulation 
(PWM) and use either voltage or current-mode control to regulate the 
output voltage level. The current-mode control is usually used in modern 
switching regulator designs to overcome the disadvantages of the voltage-
mode control [42]. There are two main advantages of current-mode, one is 
voltage error is directly reflected in the switching current and the other one 
is achieving fast response time. Considering these benefits, switching 
regulator with a DC-DC buck converter along with a digital closed loop 
system is used in this work. This is the most general setup used for 
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microprocessor systems. The Simulink model of the voltage actuator with 
feedback loop is presented in Appendix D. 
The system mainly comprises of an output filter, a switching circuit, a 
pulse width modulation and a controller. PWM modulates the duty cycle 
d, duration of the ON and OFF pulses that are applied to the switching 
transistor in a switching converter. As shown in Figure 4.5, the converter’s 
output voltage (Vo) is compared with a reference voltage (Vref) via 
compensation circuit to generate the error voltage signal (Verror). The ADC 
in the digital controller computes the digitized error, e(n) after comparing 
with the reference input. The digital compensator block uses discrete time 
integral unit to compute digital control command using  d(n) from digital 
error, e(n) and PWM converts d(n) to time domain signal, d (t). The PWM 
unit converts the error voltage into the clocking signal with duty cycle to 
control the converter. The duty cycle is adjusted based on the error signal 
to make the output voltage follow the reference value and vary the output 
voltage to a fixed voltage level. 
The simulation of the proposed system is performed using 
Matlab/Simulink and achieved a power savings of 21% compared to a 
fixed voltage system. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the system, 
different voltage and frequency transitions are considered. The different 
configurations of the control signals can be seen in Figure 4.6. Here T1 and 
T0 are the predicted error signals before the actual timing error occurs and 
depending on this value, an appropriate action is performed. For instance 
T1 and T0 are {00} the processor will increase its clock frequency in order to 
exploit the timing margins. If T1 and T0 are {01} the processor will decrease 
its clock frequency to prevent the failure of the actual critical paths. Fout 
signal indicates the frequency increase or decrease and Vpresent indicates the 
reference voltage supplied to the buck converter from the controller.  
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The controller’s next job after frequency selection is to provide reference 
voltage to the converter. Here the condition is, frequency and voltage 
values can be set to any value within the predefined upper and lower 
bounds. The following linear equation describes the relationship between 
voltage and frequency.  
   
         
         
       (4-1) 
         
             
 
         (4-2) 
Where m is the slope of the voltage and frequency function, fmax and fmin 
are the maximum and minimum values of the frequency, Vmax and Vmin are 
the maximum and minimum values of voltage, Vpresent is the present value 
of the voltage and Fpresent is the present value of the frequency.  
 
 
Figure 4.6: Simulation results of the AVS controller 
The converter provides regulated output voltage between 0.6 and 1.2 volts 
for an input voltage of 12V. The output capacitor and inductor values used 
are 376 μF and 4.1μH respectively. Design performance summary of the 
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proposed digital controller in closed loop operation is listed in Table 2. 
This study results provides motivation to propose an effective timing 
monitor to achieve maximum power savings or performance improvement 
Table 2: Parameters and design specifications of voltage actuator 
Parameter Value 
Frequency 2.7 – 3.6 GHz 
Regulated output voltage 0.6-1.2 V 
ADC Quantization 15 mV 
DPWM switching frequency 1 MHZ 
Power efficiency 84-94 % 
 
4.3 Summary 
In general, the excess timing margins are incorporated for a typical system 
operating conditions to include unpredicted process and environmental 
changes. The characteristic aggressive scaling based system employs 
monitors and it usually operates the system outside of the desired 
operating range to eliminate the excess timing margins. This situation is 
generally advantageous to the emerging modern processor designs but the 
challenge is to provide a stable and reliable operation. 
 
The latest research addresses the above issue at different levels of the 
system design hierarchy. Among these, the more preferable are the circuit 
level techniques which directly track the implications of reducing the 
margins and thus allowing the system to be operated beyond the worst 
case estimates. In this chapter, the available research is categorised into 
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three categories based on their hardware design. In brief, the direct 
approach samples the data at two different instants of time to detect any 
timing violations, compares them to detect an error and corrects them 
using a special circuitry. The main drawback of this approach is stalling 
the pipeline for an entire cycle in the event of an error [54]. As a result, the 
approach has a major performance impact in the event of an error. 
 
On the other hand, the indirect approach predicts the error by replicating 
the critical path in the design before it actually happens. This approach 
also makes the system work beyond the operating range while incurring 
errors. The main limitation of this technique is the real and duplicated 
critical paths differ in the presence of manufacturing and process 
variations; therefore, timing margins are required to account for these 
variations.  Thus it is not possible to remove timing margins completely 
with this approach.  
 
Contrary to the above two approaches, the time borrowing approach 
borrows time from the next successive pipeline stages. The limitation of 
this approach is the small checking window for the timing speculation. 
Also, an aggressive voltage scaling (AVS) based system using delay 
monitoring unit along with a closed loop control buck converter is 
presented. The proposed technique scales down the operating voltage 
based on the timing error provided by the delay monitor unit. The 
controller makes decisions and gives command to the closed loop buck 
converter. The buck converter consists of an Analogue to Digital Converter 
(ADC), a Pulse Width Modulation (PWM) and a Digital compensator. A 
complete model of the system is developed using Matlab/Simulink. This 
system is simulated over a frequency range of 2.7 to 3.6 GHz 
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corresponding to a regulated voltage range of 0.6 to 1.2V and achieved 21% 
power savings compared to the system without the AVS technique.  The 
next chapter details an overview and experimental analysis of Power 
Analysis Attacks and Countermeasures. 
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CHAPTER 5  
 
Power Analysis Attacks and Countermeasures: 
Overview and Experimental Study 
 
The Internet of Things (IoT) is the emerging technology of embedded 
systems.  In brief, IoT is the network of objects connected tighter to 
perform tasks without any human intervention. Since any device 
connected to the network can have access to all devices connected to the 
same network and also end users poses a significant security problem, a 
key focus area of the new development of IoT is the security of the IoT 
devices. Similarly the other applications of embedded systems such as 
online payments, banking transactions and encrypted storage require 
resistance from attacks. To improve the security of embedded systems, 
software level approaches, complex mathematical functions are generally 
employed to encrypt and decrypt data. However, software level security 
alone proven to be inadequate to protect the devices from attacks. 
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Therefore, today’s embedded systems include security also as one of the 
design constraints. That extends the security scheme all the way down to 
circuit level. Therefore, to address the needs of modern systems, a 
technique based on the circuit and architectural level is proposed here. 
This chapter presents a brief overview of differential power analysis 
attacks, a major threat to the hardware security of systems and then 
introduces the most Advanced Encryption Algorithm, AES to protect the 
system from the power analysis attacks. In order to improve the security of 
embedded systems, the first step must be implementing countermeasure to 
the Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks. The procedure involved in 
the practical realization of DPA attacks is provided in this chapter along 
with the experimental setup and the methodology used to compare real 
and hypothetical values to detect the secure information used. 
Research in cryptography to provide secure systems results in more 
secured cryptographic algorithms that provide data security and 
authenticity. However, the most secured cryptographic algorithms are 
mathematically secured but not their physical realization. The hardware 
implementation of the encryption and decryption process leaks the secret 
information in the system unintentionally; such information is called side-
channel information leakage. In general, there are different potential 
information leakage side-channels such as power consumption [65], [66] , 
electromagnetic radiation [67], [68] and execution time [69] in a 
cryptographic system. The most common method is obtaining the system 
information through the power consumption called power analysis attacks. 
The power analysis attacks extract the secret information by measuring the 
power consumption while the system is performing the encryption or 
decryption process. 
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According to Kocher [19], power analysis attacks are two types: simple 
power analysis attacks (SPA) [20] and Differential power analysis attacks 
(DPA) [21]. SPA, as the name suggests, analyses the power trace to identify 
the data and instruction used while encryption or decryption process. 
Generally, the attacker identifies the number of iterations used to encrypt 
or decrypt the data. For example Data Encryption Standard (DES) 
algorithm contains 8 encryption rounds; AES algorithm uses 16 rounds of 
encryption as seen in Figure 5.1. The power trace captured using our 
experimental setup is shown in Figure 5.2. With the clear observation of 
the trace, the repetition of patterns in a trace can be identified. Processors 
generally contain different set instructions, which exhibit different power 
profiles. For instance, XOR instruction usually display the highest peak 
when compared with AND instruction, which display the lowest peak in 
the power trace. Data identification can be done using Hamming weight, 
which reveal the number of transitions during instruction execution. 
Simple power analysis attacks are very easy to implement but the 
prediction depends on the attacker’s knowledge and expertise. In addition, 
SPA becomes more complex even in simple countermeasures are used. 
 
Figure 5.1: Power trace of AES algorithm [6] 
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Figure 5.2: Captured Power trace of encryption algorithm using PIC 
microcontroller 
In contrast, a Differential Power analysis Attack (DPA) [65] [70] is the most 
powerful and sophisticated method to identify the secret key information 
when countermeasures are used. DPA was first introduced by Kocher in 
[65], where statistical analysis is used to determine the secret key 
information in the system. The statistical analysis of DPA eases the job of 
revealing the key even if the measurements contain large amounts of noise. 
The direct analysis of SPA in the presence of noise is impossible to reveal 
the key. 
 
5.1 AES principle 
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a means of encrypting and 
decrypting data adapted by the National Institution of Standards and 
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Technology (NIST) on October 2, 2000 [71]. The standard DES algorithm 
was replaced by this advanced algorithm, which was introduced by 
Rijandel [71], [72]. This algorithm encrypts symmetric block cipher and 
decrypts data using a secret key. As seen in Figure 5.3, the flowchart 
provides the sequence of operations grouped as AddRoundKey, SubBytes, 
Shiftrows and Mixcolumns. N is the number of encryption rounds. The 
algorithm fragments the input to be encrypted into sub blocks and repeats 
the same procedure for N-1 encryption rounds. The AddRoundKey 
operation combines the input data with a secret key. It performs a simple 
bit-wise XOR operation of plain text with the key. This function does need 
an explicit inverse function for decryption. In SubBytes, each byte in the 
state is replaced by its corresponding byte in a table called Sbox. Sbox 
contains multiplicative inverse of all possible bytes over GF(28) followed 
by an offline transformation [73]. This function is implemented as a look 
up table in this case but can be computed dynamically. In the ShiftRows 
transformation, each row of the state is considered separately and the bytes 
in that row are cyclically shifted to the left based upon the key-size of the 
algorithm. For the 128-bit key, the first row is unchanged; however, the 
second, third and fourth rows are shifted by one, two, and three bytes 
respectively. The MixColumns transformation is a bricklayer permutation 
operating on each column of the state [73]. In MixColumns, columns of the 
State are considered as a four-term polynomial over GF(28), then are 
multiplied with a fixed polynomial c(x) = 03.x3 + 01.x2 + 01.x + 02. The 
algorithm for the decryption has the same structure but uses mathematical 
inverses of the encryption steps, i.e. InvSubBytes, InvShiftRows, and 
InvMixColumns. The round keys are the same as those in encryption but 
are used in reverse order.  The Sbox is the most important and power 
consuming element for power analysis attacks. Therefore, for most of the 
research experiments, the Sbox design is used as system being attacked.  
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Figure 5.3: Flowchart of AES encryption algorithm 
5.2 Related Research 
Due to the nature of IoT devices connected over the network, the security 
of the devices has received considerable attention and there is a growing 
interest in efficient and secure realization of the hardware devices. As a 
result, various countermeasures have been proposed to DPA attacks 
ranging from architectural to system level. All the techniques aim to 
reduce the direct relation between power consumption and its internal 
processing of data. The countermeasures available are grouped into two 
methods; masking and hiding. 
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In general, masking methods [74]-[76] modify the input data being 
processed with a random mask in the encryption or decryption process. In 
general, the power consumption depends on the input data and its 
computation. Using random mask provides randomness in the power 
consumption and makes it difficult to reveal the input data being used. At 
the end, the corresponding mask must be used to recover the original input 
data. Masking methods can be applied at either algorithmic level or gate 
level. Most of the research available is based on algorithmic level because 
of its ease of implementation.  
5.2.1 Masking 
Data masking uses a random arbitrary value or function to mask the input 
data or intermediate result. In [65], Kocher proposed an early 
countermeasure based on this principle to prevent timing attacks. Another 
technique proposed in [2] to randomize the intermediate values using a 
mask. As a result, the intermediate value during the encryption process 
becomes unpredictable by transforming the actual computation into 
execution involving random values [18].  
In general, the intermediate function is done as follows: c = A XOR K. 
Usage of the data mask modifies the intermediate computation m below: 
                                         m = m  A        (5-1) 
                                         (5-2) 
  
Figure 5.4 illustrates the difference between normal operation and data 
masking of Sbox. In the case of normal operation, the Sbox function is 
implemented as XORing the input with the secret key. A new addition 
here is the random mask calculation. The masked input and the secret key 
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are XORed together to generate the random or masked intermediate data. 
When the attacker tries to attack such system with the random information 
instead of the actual one, it does not make the attacks impossible but 
increases the number of attempts to reveal the secret key. 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Illustration of data masking (a) Normal Sbox operation (b) Sbox with 
data masking 
In [65], a simple mask is added to the plain text instead of adding the 
masked value to the Sbox function. A similar technique proposed in [77], 
same mask is used before and after Sbox computation. However, a new 
random mask is generated for every encryption round. 
A technique proposed in [23] claims that it provides an implementation of 
DES and AES encryption algorithms secure against attacks. The technique 
masks all the computations throughout the AES algorithm with random 
values. Usage of additional multiplicative and addictive masks provides 
randomness but costs 3x runtime and 2x in memory space. To add more 
randomness into the data, Messerges presented in [78] two complex masks; 
one based on Boolean logic and the other based on arithmetic logic. The 
Boolean mask is calculated using bit wise XOR operation of input   and 
random mask  x, as in Equation (5-3), to generate a masked value    . In 
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Equation (5-4), arithmetic mask uses addition or subtraction modulo 2n, 
where n in the word length.  
                        x      (5-3) 
                         x) mod 2n   [78]  (5-4) 
In [78], all operations except addition and multiplication are masked using 
Boolean mask, whereas the Arithmetic mask is used for addition and 
multiplication. Both the masks are used for various encryption algorithms 
such as Mars, RC6, Rijandel, Serpent and Two Fish. The authors claim that 
Rijandel algorithm is best suited for masking and overall, data masking is 
the best solution to prevent DPA attacks.  
 
Another variation to the data masking is the masking of intermediate 
function, as shown in Figure 5.5. The earlier one uses a random mask with 
the input data to randomize power consumption. The later one uses a 
mask to the output of the Sbox function. 
 
Figure 5.5: Random data masking (a) Before Sbox function (b) After Sbox 
function 
Masking the Sbox provides more unpredictability since its output is used 
for power analysis attacks. In AES, the Sbox operation can be realized by 
using look up tables or direct calculation. The look up table approach 
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receives data and sends the output based on look table value in the 
computation. Direct calculation involves complex implementation of the 
function. In [78] proposed another countermeasure based on Sbox 
masking, which uses an input mask      and an output mask     . The input 
x is masked using     and fed into the table T, to map the masked value 
into a different value. The resultant output is masked again using     , and 
stored in a new masked table    . The entire operation of the Sbox masking 
is shown by Equation (5-5). 
                            (5-5) 
However, the drawback of their approach is the memory space requires 
storing the pre-computed tables and significant amount of time for the 
computation. 
 
On the other hand, the hiding methods use techniques to make power 
consumption of the device the same for different operations. In [79], [80], a 
new logic cell called Wave Dynamical Differential Logic (WDDL) and 
Sense Amplify based Logic are proposed to make power consumption 
same for different operations. In order to perform this, the normal regular 
cell needs to be replaced by this new cell technology to consume the same 
power for different operations. In [81], another technique is proposed 
based on switching capacitors. The switching capacitors isolate the power 
supply and the device by providing power to the device during capacitor 
discharge time instead of power supply.  
However, these countermeasures provide security improvement but 
involve extra hardware cost and throughput degradation. For example, the 
WDDL method can increase the security by using 3 times larger silicon 
area and 75% throughput degradation [2]. The switching capacitor method 
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can reduce the area overhead by 27%, but the performance is still degraded 
by 50% [82]. 
 
5.3 DPA attacks: An Experimental Study 
In this section, the experimental procedure used to realize power analysis 
attacks on a PIC microcontroller based systems is presented in detail. 
Before that, the possible setups, which can be used for the attacks are 
discussed. The results of these experiments provide the foundation for our 
design concept, which is described later in the coming chapters. 
5.4 Practical Implementations of DPA Attacks 
In this section, the different methodologies used to realize practical 
implementations of DPA attacks are demonstrated. Generally, power 
analysis attacks can be realized in two ways: simulation based and real 
measurements based.  Both the environments can be used to attack any 
electronic system and to evaluate various countermeasures. The purpose of 
this section is to prove that the DPA attack involves ease of 
implementation and it poses a serious problem to the security of the 
embedded systems.  
5.4.1 Simulation based DPA 
The procedure for both the setups simulation and real measurements is the 
same except for the arrangement of the power consumption of the target 
device.  
In simulation based, the power consumption is obtained from a simulation 
tool instead of real power measurements captured using an oscilloscope. 
Power estimation tools are used to estimate the power consumption of the 
device, before even it is fabricated. The countermeasures can also be tested 
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and evaluated before the actual device is fabricated itself. This is the main 
advantage of simulation based compared to that of real measurements 
based.  Other advantages include the ease of implementation and noise 
free measurements from the simulation tools [83].  The simulation based 
DPA attack methodology is depicted in Figure 5.6. In order to estimate the 
accurate power measurements, the target design along with a set of plain 
texts is commonly used. A testbench needs to be created using a secret key, 
which is same for all the inputs in the set. Power traces are generated and 
partitioned with respect to its corresponding inputs. To compare the 
generated power traces with the estimated values, a hypothetical power 
model generation with the same inputs is essential. In order to estimate the 
secret key used in the RTL simulation, statistical techniques must be used 
on both simulated and hypothetical power values. In [83] , explored the 
simulation based measurements and compared with the real 
measurements. Modelsim tool is used for RTL and gate level simulation 
and for the testbench. To estimate accurate power simulations, Nanosim is 
used. 
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Figure 5.6: Simulation based DPA Attack implementation strategy 
5.4.2 Power simulation tools 
Generally speaking, there are many power simulation tools available to 
estimate power consumption of a digital circuit. The selection of tools 
mainly depends on the accuracy, which must be as close to the actual 
measurements as possible and the simulation time. In the case of power 
analysis attacks, the simulation time is the deciding factor because it 
involves many number of encryption rounds thus consume more time. The 
available power simulation tools are Hspice[84] Spectre[85], Nanosim[86], 
Primepower[88], Ultraism[87]. 
Hspice is an accurate circuit simulator from Synopsys. Also, the tool 
precisely predicts the timing, functionality and power consumption. 
Sprectre is a power estimation tool from Cadence. As mentioned in [83] 
both tools computation time depends on the circuit design size. As the 
circuit size increases, the simulation time increases.  
Primetime, another tool from Synopsys, generates power estimation using 
gate level simulation. The work presented in [18] used this tool to generate 
the power simulation traces. The efficiency of the tool depends on the 
available libraries. Other tools such as Nanosim and ultraism can be used 
for low level power estimation. In [83] , Nanosim is used to generate 
accurate power simulations and claimed that the tool provides results very 
close to the real measurements. However, majority of these tools need 
accurate details of the design at circuit level and gate level to provide 
accurate power traces.  Considering this fact and the limitations of the 
available tools, the power analysis attacks are realized in this work using 
the second method, real measurements based. 
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5.4.3 Real measurements based methodology 
In this section, the real measurements based methodology is presented 
along with hardware and software design flow, as depicted in Figure 5.7. 
The software design flow, which is necessary for the statistical analysis to 
reveal the secret information, is implemented using Matlab software. On 
the other hand, the hardware flow comprises of coding of AES algorithm 
[89], downloading it on to a microcontroller and capturing of power traces 
while executing encryption or decryption  
The DPA attack methodology followed in this work is similar to the 
approach presented in [90], where mixed environment of hardware and 
software used to replicate the actual realistic attacks. In order to make the 
attacks successful, a sequence of operations need to be performed.  
 
Figure 5.7: Real- measurements based DPA Attack implementation strategy 
The first step is identifying the intermediate value of the AES algorithm, 
which is the AddRoundKey operation. This is the XOR operation of the 
first byte of the plain text and the first byte of the key. The result of this 
function is substituted with a non-linear byte value with the use of Sbox. 
The power analysis was focused on first byte of the secret key. Due to this 
reason it is necessary to measure power consumption corresponding to the 
nonlinear operation of SubBytes. The reason for this is simple linear 
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operations such as AddRoundKey does not leak enough information. In 
general, AES algorithm encrypts 128 bit input data using 128, 192, 256 key 
bits. The algorithm is implemented on PIC microcontroller using C 
language, with 128 bit input and 128 bit key.  The detailed implementation 
of AES algorithm is presented in Appendix B. 
The second step is measuring power consumption while this process is 
executed. Once the setup is established, the oscilloscope was triggered to 
record the power consumption data and the number of samples recorded 
depends on the Digital Storage Oscilloscope (DSO) settings. For instance, if 
the frequency of the microcontroller is 1MHz and the signal is sampled 
using DSO with a sampling rate of 50Msa/s provides 50 samples of data 
per cycle.  For each input, power consumption is recorded and the same 
procedure is repeated for different plain texts and each plain text 
conversion is called an encryption round. Hence the data collected is 
represented as a two dimension matrix, P [0...99][500], where the first index 
represents encryption rounds and the second index represents the number 
of samples. 
The third step is estimating the hypothetical power consumption. As 
shown in Figure 5.7, this phase is implemented in Matlab, whereas the 
above two steps are related to the hardware.  The model used in this case is 
Hamming Weight model, which is used to predict the power model of the 
attacked system. Here the quality depends on the knowledge of the 
attacker about the targeted device. The better the simulation of the attacker 
matches the actual power consumption characteristics of the device, the 
more effective the DPA attack is [71].  The attacker expects that the power 
consumption is directly proportional to the number of non-zero bits in the 
processed data. The data values that are processed before or after this 
value are ignored. From this reason, HW model is not suitable for 
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simulation of the CMOS circuits but the experimental results from practice 
show that Hamming weight of currently processed data is dependent on 
power consumption of CMOS circuits and it can be used. The second basic 
power simulation model is Hamming distance model (HD), in this the 
attacker expects that the power consumption is directly proportional to the 
number of changed data values in the processed data. The attacker can 
map the data which are transmitted via data bus to the value of power 
consumption without the knowledge of the device netlist. Power 
consumption, which is caused by a change of the data bus value from v0 to 
v1 is proportional to HD (v0, v1) = HW (v0  v1). Similarly, it can be applied 
to other buses such as the address buses and to the power description of 
registers. 
In fourth step, the task is to apply statistical analysis on the measured and 
hypothetical power traces. The most commonly used methods are 
correlation analysis [71], difference of means [90] and in this experiment, 
correlation analysis method is used in for detecting the secret key.  
5.4.3.1 Correlation Analysis 
The correlation coefficient is one of the best known methods to determine 
the linear relationship between two random variables. Hence, it is also a 
suitable method for performing DPA attacks. A very well deﬁned theory 
exists for the correlation coefficient which can be used to model the static 
properties of DPA attacks. The correlation coefficient is deﬁned by the 
covariance as follows: 
       
               
             
    (5-6) 
Here T and P are two variables to be compared and the correlation 
coefficient reveals the relation between them. It is a dimensionless quantity 
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and it can only accept values between plus and minus one −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Value 
‘−1’ of correlation coefficient denotes indirect dependence that is the 
change in one group is accompanied by an opposite change in the second 
group. Value ‘0’ indicates that detectable statistic dependence between 
values of the two groups does not exist. Whereas, if the correlation 
coefficient is equal to 1, it indicates a direct dependence or a perfect 
correlation between the values of the two groups. In correlation analysis, 
the correlation coefficient is the main important attribute, which reveals 
the relationship between the two variables.  
5.4.4 Experimental Setup for DPA attacks 
This section provides the experimental setup used for a successful DPA 
attack along with the obtained experimental results. It includes the detailed 
information about the devices used, their typical features and the settings 
used for the attack. 
 
Figure 5.8: Experimental setup 
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The main components of this setup are a PIC microcontroller [91] based 
board and Digital Storage Oscilloscope GDS-820S, as shown in Figure 5.8. 
The typical features of the devices used for the measurement are given in  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.  The testbed used for the attacks is a PIC microcontroller based 
board, which represents a cryptographic module. The details and 
schematics of the testbed and the basics of microcontroller programming 
can be found in [92]- [93].  The cryptographic module, AES was developed 
and downloaded to the microcontroller and verified with test vectors. DPA 
attack was realized after the verification of the algorithm. The input plain 
text data block was sent to the microcontroller from the computer. There it 
was encrypted and sent back to the computer. The data interface between 
microcontroller and computer was achieved using Microchip In-Circuit 
Debugger, MPLAB ICD3. 
The selection of the measurement procedure depends on the available 
resources and requirements. In this case, a resistor method, with a small 
resistor of 10 Ohms is connected between the power supply and the board 
to measure power consumption across the device. Due to the insertion of 
the resistor, the instantaneous current consumed by the system can be 
measured and this current is a measure of the power consumed. The next 
communication interface is from the board to the oscilloscope.  
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Table 3: Details of equipment used 
 
GDS-820s has different interfaces such as RS-232, USB and Parallel 
Interface; however, USB interface is not suitable for transferring the 
captured data to the computer. Out of the other two available interfaces, 
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RS-232 interface is used in this work because speed is not the paramount 
importance in these attacks. The FreeCapture [94] software captures data 
from the oscilloscope to the PC using RS- 232 Interface. The configuration 
in the software and the oscilloscope must be the same for a successful 
communication. But the software used may vary with the scope. The data 
is stored in the computer in csv file format and this file is used in Matlab 
for further analysis. 
The attack is realized using the general procedure described earlier and 
the results of the Correlation analysis are shown in Figure 5.9 and Figure 
5.10. The highest peak in the figure 5.10 shows the correlation coefficient 
for that key value. This information provides the attacker the first byte of 
the secret key and the same process must be repeated to reveal the entire 
key. 
 
Figure 5.9: DPA Attack with a wrong key guess 
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Figure 5.10: DPA Attack using Correlation Analysis for key = 35 
 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter provides an overview of Differential Power Analysis attack 
and the practical realization of the attack. DPA attacks are most powerful 
in the presence of noise and countermeasures. Understanding the concepts 
and subsequent realization of a successful attack is challenging. In this 
chapter, the DPA attack with a detailed description of steps along with the 
full information about the experimental setup, device features and their 
communication for better understanding of the whole process is presented. 
The AES algorithm is implemented on microcontroller and the attack was 
focused only on the SubBytes. The power traces are captured using the 
setup and the analysis is carried out using Matlab. In the next chapter, a 
novel technique based on aggressive mechanisms to overcome the 
drawbacks of the available research is presented. 
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CHAPTER 6  
 
A Novel Time-Borrowing Technique for Aggressive 
Voltage/Frequency Scaling 
 
Low power consumption along with better performance has become an 
important aspect of processor and system design. Many techniques 
ranging from architectural to system level are available. Among all 
methods, voltage/frequency scaling methods are the most effective to 
achieve low power consumption as dynamic power is proportional to 
frequency and square of supply voltage. The key idea of aggressive voltage 
scaling is to adjust the supply voltage to the lowest level possible to 
achieve maximum power benefit, while ensuring reliable operation. 
Similarly, aggressive frequency scaling is to alter the operating frequency 
to achieve maximum performance improvement. In this chapter, an 
aggressive voltage/frequency scaling technique using time-borrowing 
feature is presented. The proposed technique allows the system to go 
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beyond the worst case estimates of the operating voltage/frequency based 
on timing error to improve performance or to reduce power consumption 
of the systems. The technique uses the flip-flop and latch combination to 
double sample the input data to detect any timing violations as 
frequency/voltage is scaled. The detected violations are masked by phase 
delaying the flip-flop clock to capture the late arrival data because of 
dynamic variations. This makes the system timing error tolerant without 
error correction timing penalty. The technique is validated by prototyping 
on to an FPGA in Spartan 3E FPGA development board using two stage 
arithmetic pipeline. In addition to this, the technique is implemented in 
various benchmarks to evaluate the performance improvement. 
Due to the increased use of mobile and portable devices, power 
consumption has become a major constraint in the design of modern 
processors. Many techniques ranging from architectural to system level 
have been developed. Of all these, dynamic voltage and frequency scaling 
(DVFS) has received more attention over the last two decades. This 
technique dynamically adjusts voltage and frequency depending on the 
present task requirements, thereby reduces the power consumption of the 
system. The technique has been proven ideal to trade off performance and 
power consumption of a processor because supply voltage reduction is the 
ideal way of achieving low power consumption. Due to its benefits, DVFS 
has been used not only to reduce power and temperature but also to 
improve security of the systems from power analysis attacks. The 
traditional DVFS approach scales the supply voltage based on either 
workload or timing margins available [95] . To guarantee safe operation, 
voltage and frequency pairs are pre-determined along with workload 
conditions by considering all process corners. The hardware realization of 
this open loop system uses Look Up Tables (LUTs) to store voltage and 
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frequency pairs. Since the LUT is pre-loaded with values, the system is not 
able to adapt to process variations or environmental conditions. The basic 
DVFS technique has lost its demand as process technology advances due to 
the increasing Process, Voltage and Temperature (PVT) variations. 
On the other hand, timing margin based DVFS is a closed loop system, 
which adaptively changes supply voltages to a minimum level to meet 
performance requirements by considering process, voltage and 
temperature variations. The typical closed loop system employs a 
monitoring algorithm to provide application requirements in order to 
configure the programmable DC-DC converter and the programmable 
clock generator. In recent years, this technique uses critical path monitors 
to monitor critical path delay in a process and adjusts the 
frequency/voltage so as to minimize timing margins during run time. 
The direct monitors track the actual critical path delay during run time for 
detecting and correcting timing errors. This technique is more effective in 
reducing all the timing margins. However, this approach detects errors 
after their occurrence and requires large timing penalty for error 
correction. 
The indirect monitors use critical path replicas (CPR) that reflect the delay 
behaviour of the actual critical paths in the design. The design of these 
CPRs is most critical and it must be as close to the actual delay of the 
circuit as possible because these are used to generate the feedback signal 
controlling voltage or frequency of the processor. This technique requires 
large timing margin compared to the direct technique because of the 
difference between the actual and predicted paths. 
The time-borrowing monitors mask timing error by borrowing time, either 
delaying the arrival time of the correct data to the next pipeline stage or 
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delaying the clock to capture the late arrival data. This technique needs 
large checking window to be more effective. The checking window is 
referred as the period of time after the clock edge reserved for error 
detection and masking. 
To summarize, the main challenges posed by aggressive 
voltage/frequency scaling are :-  i) reducing large timing penalty for error 
correction and ii) reducing large timing margins and iii) having large 
checking window for error detection and correction. All these issues can be 
dealt by using a suitable critical path monitor. Hence, for the AVS system 
to have better power savings, it must have a suitable critical path monitor. 
6.1 Difference between Latch and Flip-flop 
Before diving into the discussion of the proposed technique based on 
aggressive scaling, it is appropriate to first review the fundamentals of 
sequential elements and the approach used to develop digital ICs. The two 
basic sequential elements used in digital logic to store information are flip-
flop and latch.  Both these elements are used to store single bit of 
information. The fundamental difference between these two is; latch is a 
level sensitive device and flip-flop is an edge sensitive device. In other 
words, latch changes its output based on the input changes as long as the 
enable signal is asserted. On the other hand, flip-flops change its output as 
the input changes either at the rising or falling edge of the enable signal. 
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Figure 6.1: VHDL code snippets for latch and flip-flop 
 
Figure 6.2 shows the difference between latch and flip-flop using timing 
waveforms. The corresponding VHDL code for both the elements is shown 
in Figure 6.1. Here ‘Q’, ‘d’ are the input and output of the elements and ‘en’ 
is the enable signal and decides the operation of the blocks. In the case of 
latch, the output Q continuously checks its input d and correspondingly 
changes when the enable signal is high. The same operation can be 
completed when the enable signal is low. Therefore, Latch is called level 
sensitive device. 
In the case of flip-flop, the output Q captures the input data with respect to 
the positive edge of the enable signal. Using negative edge also, the same 
operation can be achieved. Hence, flip-flop is called edge sensitive device. 
The fundamental difference between these two elements is used to capture 
the late arrival of data in the proposed architecture. 
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Figure 6.2: Timing waveforms depicting behaviour of latch and flip-flop 
 
6.2 Digital Design Flow 
A digital design goes through a top-down approach to transform the 
original set of specifications to an end product. During its development, 
each step corresponds to a detailed description of the system, which has its 
own specific semantics and set of primitives to develop the end product, 
digital design flow can be used as application ASIC or SOC or FPGAS. 
ASIC or SOC as the name itself, the products are designed for a specific 
purpose. Hence the design flow for these devices varies keeping the 
application requirements through all the stages. In contrast to this, FPGA 
are field programmable, they work as intended by the designer. In other 
words ASIC’s are designed and manufactured keeping the application in 
mind throughout the process where FPGA’s are manufactured in advance 
and design is implemented later based on the application. In this section, a 
high level overview of the general digital design is discussed.  
Figure 6.3 presents the typical stages involved in the design flow. It 
represents a top-down approach from specifications to final product. The 
development of a product with the most typical design requirements 
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power, area, cost and functionality involve many iterations through 
various stages of the design flow. In general, the initial requirements are 
contained in a document with details of the final product functionality and 
a set of constraints that it must satisfy. In their scenario, functional design 
is the process of converting the specifications and constraints into a feasible 
solution. This involves tasks such as developing micro-architectural model 
for the entire design solution and software-hardware co-design.  
Due to its hierarchical nature of the design flow, each stage depends not 
only on the present state but also on the previous states. Hence, care must 
be taken at all stages of the design process. However, the functional stage 
is the primary stage of the flow and it also involves the basic model 
development for the entire problem, the design must spend quality time 
and   
The design architecture consists of different distinct modules, each of 
which contributes a specific functionality to the overall design. Each 
module input and output posts and communication protocol required to 
establish a link between the modules also defined here. The outcomes of 
this phase is a constructive model of the design with integration of the later 
modules developed in the following stages. 
Further to the function design is the register transfer level stage. The 
architecture of the design developed in the earlier stage is more defined 
using hardware description languages (HDL). The individual design 
elements such as memory and functional blocks are designed during this 
phase. In addition to this, the decision the clocking system to meet the 
design contracts such as performance and power is done.  
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Figure 6.3: Flowchart for digital system design 
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The RTL verification stage is involved as soon as the design phase 
completed. This stage verifies the functionality of the developed circuit 
design under the assumption that no manufacturing errors are present. 
The basic idea here is that the design must be verified functionally, 
virtually error free before proceeding further to the manufacturing. In case 
of errors, the iteration process must be initiated till the design becomes 
error free. During this phase, various techniques and test benches are 
developed to verify that the developed model meets its initial functional 
requirements. When this is not the case, the design flow has to be moved to 
the initial function design stage to modify the model and accordingly RTL 
design needs to be updated.  
The synthesis and optimization of the RTL design phase involves 
generation of a detailed model of circuit and gates, which is optimised 
based on the design constraints. In the case of power optimised design, the 
model needs to be considered as a constraint at their stage. Similarly, area 
and performance can also be applied. The outcome of this stage provides a 
model, which is a combination of different gates, interconnect logic and 
memories. The resultant model is optimized for the design constraints and 
their procedure involves number of iterations before it provides a suitable 
solution to meet the requirements. 
Up to this stage, the procedure is same for all digital devices. In the case of 
FPGA, the target FPGA needs to be selected and then place and route 
places all the internal cells and connectivity between them. Generally, the 
design flow for FPGA is done using FPGA vendor tools such as Xilinx IDE 
and Altera Quartus. The tools provide a back annotate file, which can be 
used in timing analysis and a bit stream file, which can be used to program 
the FPGA. The next stage in the flow is the RTL and gates verification. This 
stage is to verify the earlier developed RTL model functionality and the 
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later developed gate-level model. The pre-synthesis and post-synthesis 
models are verified for functional correctness. The final three stages of the 
design flow involve mapping the design into a geometrical layout for 
fabrication. In the end, the fabricated chip is tested and packaged. 
 
6.3 Related Work 
The first classification of the available critical path monitors is direct 
monitors. The best example for this category is Razor technique [31]. This 
technique detects timing error by double sampling the critical path output 
at different points in time and compares them with each other. Some of the 
benefits of this technique are highlighted in [31], however, it poses 
significant challenges. The technique monitors critical path signals for late 
arrival data, detects error after the system is corrupted and stalls the 
current execution to recover from the error. Furthermore, Razor circuits are 
susceptible to datapath metastability, requiring substantial design 
overhead [96]. 
TEAtime [55] is the best example for the next category, indirect monitors. 
This method uses critical path replica to estimate the timing error before it 
actually happens. This is achieved by replicating the most critical paths to 
estimate the behaviour of the path with respect to voltage/frequency 
scaling. The advantages of this method are 1) errors are detected before 
they actually happen; 2) no need for architecture modification of processor 
designs. But the major drawback of indirect monitoring is how well the 
replica resembles the actual critical path.  
The third classification is based on time borrowing feature. Many 
techniques have been proposed related to this, including Transition 
Detector with Time Borrowing (TDTB) [97], Double Sampling with Time 
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Borrowing (DSTB) [97] and Timber [57]. In DSTB, the position of flip-flop 
and latch are interchanged to eliminate datapath metastability but the 
checking window for timing speculation is small compared to Razor flip-
flop. Timber proposed a new time borrowing scheme, which detects late 
arrival of data and masks by reducing the arrival time of the correct data to 
the next pipeline stage [96]. The drawback of Timber is the small checking 
window for timing speculation. In conventional systems, closed loop is 
used to change the delay of the flip-flop clock based on timing error on the 
fly. This will consume more power as the phase of the clock is changing on 
the fly. Moreover, clock signal and clock tree are the most power 
consuming elements of a digital processor. 
 
Table 4 Comparison of present technique to other latest techniques 
 
Indirect 
(CPR) 
Razor TDTB Timber DSTB 
Present 
Technique 
Architecture 
Modification 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Less, no need to 
replace all 
registers 
in the pipeline 
Datapath 
Metastability 
No Yes No Yes No No 
Error 
Correction 
Overhead 
No Yes No No No No 
Area 
Overhead 
High 
CPM + Error 
Correction Circuitry 
Mediu
m 
High Medium Small 
Design 
Complexity 
High Low High High Low Low 
Timing Margin Large Small Small Small Small Small 
Power 
Overhead 
CPM 
CPM + Additional 
Pipes + 
Recomputing + 
Buffers 
CPM CPM CPM CPM 
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6.4 Principle of Operation 
The aim of the proposed technique is to operate systems beyond worst case 
estimates by avoiding the excessive error correction overhead and timing 
margins. To reduce excess timing penalty of error correction overhead, the 
following timing monitor unit using time borrowing approach is 
presented. 
Figure 6.4 shows a gate-level circuit diagram of the proposed unit. The 
fundamental idea of the present technique is to delay the main clock in 
such a way that the late arrival data can be captured with time borrowing. 
The proposed circuit mainly consists of the following elements: flip-flop, 
latch, multiplexed clock signal and enable signal. The combination of flip-
flop and latch performs double sampling to identify when there is any 
timing violation as in Razor circuit. However in this circuit, as in DSTB, the 
position of flip-flop and latch are interchanged to avail the feature of time 
borrowing and to reduce sequence overhead. But the drawback of DSTB is 
having small checking window for timing speculation. 
 
Figure 6.4 Gate-level diagram of proposed technique 
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The present technique overcomes this drawback by adding a multiplexed 
clock signal to further extend the checking window. Having larger 
checking window helps to detect timing error if the data arrives late, 
further the rising edge of the clock signal [98]. Another added feature is 
enable signal, which helps to activate/deactivate the time borrowing 
feature. The proposed circuit detects timing error by double sampling the 
data using flip-flop and latch combination. When data arrives late, the 
output of flip-flop and latch differ, and thereby activates the error signal, 
which in turn changes the phase of the clock signal to the flip-flop. Now 
flip-flop clock is delayed by 0.5 times the latch clock. Flip-flop can receive 
the late arrival data and eliminate the timing error. If the error continues 
beyond this point, further action needs to be taken to change voltage or 
frequency. To reduce the sequential clock energy overhead, both main and 
delayed clock signals are generated beforehand and only the selection is 
done on the fly. 
 
6.5 Timing Waveforms 
Figure 6.5 shows the timing waveforms of the present technique. The main 
clock and the input data signals are clk and d_in respectively. The same 
input data d_in is fed to both the sequential elements flip-flop and latch.  
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Figure 6.5 Timing Diagram illustrating the behaviour of the present 
technique in the presence of errors 
During cycle 2, d in arrives before setup time and rising edge of the flip-
flop. This is the ideal case of operation for any digital circuit. The input 
data is captured correctly by both flip-flop and latch. Hence, there is no 
error signal during cycle 3. 
During cycle 4, d in arrives after rising edge of the main clock signal, clk. 
As frequency is scaled beyond the worst case estimate, the input data 
arrives late [99]. This means that the clock frequency is not sufficient for 
the critical signal to travel along the path. So flip-flop missed the data, 
causing the error signal to be activated. When it happens, the multiplexer 
selects the phase delayed clock and flip-flop uses this to capture the late 
arrival data. The error signal is masked immediately as soon as both flip-
flop and latch capture the same data. Since the error is masked, the present 
technique resumes the normal pipeline operation. 
 
99 
 
6.6 Timing Constraints 
To ensure correct functionality, the input data must arrive a setup time 
prior to the rising edge of the clock. Sometimes the data can arrive after the 
rising edge due to the worst case dynamic variation. The proposed 
technique can be used to ensure the correct functionality. The two main 
elements in the technique are flip-flop and latch; both elements are clocked 
by different clock signals ff clk, latch clk. Both the clocks have the same 
frequency but ff clk is phase delayed by 180 degrees with respect to the 
latch clk. Timing constraints must be analysed thoroughly to safeguard 
any digital circuit. 
The main basis for the analysis is taken from [100] for DSTB circuit; 
modified further to analyse the benefits of the present technique. The 
timing constraints for the present technique are given below; 
t (su, F) = Setup time of the flip-flop;  t(su, L) = Setup time of the latch 
tclk = clock period; tch = checking window 
tpd = propagation delay 
tch = tclk + (t(su, F) – t(su, L))                    (6-1) 
Equation (6-1) ensures that the proposed circuit has a checking window, 
which detects late arriving data. In general, the input data to be captured 
properly by the flip-flop, it must stabilize at least t (su, F) before the rising 
edge of clock. Because of the variations, there is a possibility for the late 
arrival of data. The circuit must have a large checking window to ensure 
the late arrival data can be sampled by the latch if flip-flop missed it. The 
checking window should be as wide as possible to eliminate large guard 
bands. In our case, the clock to the flip-flop is delayed by 180 degrees to 
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capture the late arrival data, which is indicated by an error signal. 
Therefore Equation (6-1) can be modified as mentioned below. 
    tch = tclk + (t(su, F) – t(su, L)) - td  
= tclk + (t(su, F) – t(su, L)) – tclk / 2    
        = tclk/2 + (t(su, F) – t(su, L))                                  (6-2) 
From Equation (6-2), it is evident that the checking window is almost 50% 
of the clock period which is wide enough to eliminate the excess timing 
margins. 
Another important metric in digital circuits is the maximum propagation 
delay, which is the maximum delay of the circuit under worst case 
conditions as in Equation (6-3). This delay helps to hide the flip-flop set up 
time from the critical path. 
 
        tpd < tclk + tpcql - t(su, F)  - td  
< tclk + (t(su, F) – t(su, L)) – tclk / 2    
< tclk/2 – tpcql - (t(su, F)                                     (6-3) 
 
6.7 Extension to Processor Architecture 
Figure 6.6 shows the integration of the present technique into the general 
five stage pipeline architecture. Unlike the techniques in [31] [55], all the 
pipeline registers need not be replaced with the new circuit. Only the 
critical paths that get negative slack because of the variations need to be 
replaced, however, the worst case situation is shown in the Figure 6.6. 
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Note that the paths that require time borrowing need to be replaced with 
the present circuit. 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Extension to general processor architecture 
 
The pipeline executes instructions normally when there is no error at any 
stage of the pipeline. If the operating frequency scaled beyond the worst 
case estimate, timing errors start to occur. Error signal is activated to 
indicate the occurrence of timing error at each stage of the pipeline. All 
these error signals are combined to generate a global error signal. Timing 
errors can be masked by phase delaying the clock to capture the late arrival 
data. The activation of global error signal indicates the worst case scenario 
of the circuit. This situation shows that the present operating 
frequency/voltage need to be altered to perform normal operation. The 
control unit makes the decision and commands clock/voltage generator to 
supply a new set of operating frequency/voltage to recover from the error. 
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6.7.1 Simulation and evaluation 
In order to verify the effectiveness of our proposed technique, 90 nm 
Spartan 3E FPGA development board has been used. The reason for 
choosing the FPGA environment is the flexibility of FPGA architecture to 
modify circuit post-placements to insert the present technique to monitor 
critical paths post-compilation. Such opportunities are not available in 
ASICs without significant incremental cost [101]. The technique is 
validated by implementing in a simple application circuit, two stage 
pipeline counter and targeted to FPGA. The implementation of this design 
is presented with DCM in Appendix C. The Spartan 3E FPGA 
development board is preferred because of two reasons 1) ease of 
frequency tuning and 2) no need to alter the hardware for evaluating the 
proposed design. Either frequency or voltage can be varied to verify any 
timing error estimation, detection and correction circuitry. In this case, 
frequency is varied to verify the effectiveness of the circuit. The whole idea 
here is to evaluate the circuit behaviour with respect to the timing error 
and not the source of the error. The timing error can occur by either 
changing voltage or frequency beyond the worst case estimate. In this 
experiment, frequency is varied by monitoring the timing error of the 
critical paths. 
The flip-flop clock is delayed by using Digital Clock Manager (DCM) and 
latch clock is set to the base clock frequency. Since the clocks have the same 
frequency, the base clock frequency is set as the main clock frequency and 
the DCM is used to provide the required phase difference to the flip-flop 
clock. 
The present technique in a two stage arithmetic pipeline has been 
implemented. The first stage of pipeline consists of an adder_subtractor 
module with 16 bit output. The second stage of pipeline uses 16 input XOR 
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tree to output the synchronised counter output. The design is simulated, 
synthesized and targeted to Xilinx Spartan 3E FPGA. The potential critical 
paths are identified with the static timing analysis. For these critical paths, 
the original flips-flops in the netlist are replaced with our present 
technique. 
 
6.7.2 Experimental methodology 
 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed unit, a control 
scheme presented in [58], is used to switch clock frequency between the 
worst case clock frequency Fmin and the possible over clock frequency Fmax. 
In this case, Fmin is the estimated worst clock frequency by the timing 
analysis. 
The phase delay between flip-flop and latch clocks are 0.5 times Fmin. 
Because of this delay, the late arrival of data detection can be extended 
from the rising edge to the negative edge of the main clock signal. This 
allows the circuit to go beyond the maximum clock frequency. The 
maximum clock frequency can be extended to 1.5 times the original/ 
estimated worst case clock frequency. To evaluate the performance of the 
proposed circuit, three scenarios, as mentioned below are monitored. 
a) Normal operation: Chosen a clock frequency below the worst case 
clock frequency. From the static timing analysis, the worst case clock 
frequency in this case is 120 MHz. The above mentioned two stage 
arithmetic is run for 10,000 cycles to count the number of errors 
occurred. No errors were found in this case and the circuit executes 
normal operation. 
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b) Over clocking: Chosen a clock frequency between worst case clock 
frequency Fmin and maximum frequency Fmax. The same procedure as 
in first case is repeated here, to monitor the number of errors that 
occurred during 10,000 cycles. Now few errors are occurred, which 
are masked by the time borrowing feature of the circuit. 
c) Aggressive over clocking: Chosen a clock frequency just below the 
maximum frequency Fmax with the same above procedure repeated 
for 10,000 cycles. These errors are masked by using this proposed 
circuit, without even error correction timing penalty. Thus this 
circuit permits aggressive over clocking beyond worst case clock 
frequency without any performance penalties. 
 
6.7.3 Experimental results 
The above procedure is used to evaluate the performance increase of the 
present technique as a function of error rate. Figure 6.7 shows the relation 
between error rate and frequency of the two stage design with and without 
present technique. In general, the occurrence of timing errors before the 
worst case clock frequency that is estimated by the CAD timing analysis is 
very rare. The same can be seen in the figure. The blue line corresponds to 
the design without the present technique, no errors occurred up to about 
124 MHz. As the operating frequency is increased beyond this point, the 
percentage of error rate started increasing. 
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Figure 6.7: Error rate vs. frequency for present technique 
The same procedure is repeated using two stage arithmetic with the 
present technique. No errors occurred until the frequency has reached up 
to 160 MHz. The timing errors occurred as the frequency tuned beyond 
worst case frequency 120 MHz. However, these errors are masked by the 
technique, causing performance improvement. The percentage of error rate 
started increasing after 160 MHz. This indicates that critical path timing 
violations exceed the maximum time borrowing allowed with the present 
technique. The two stage design with Razor technique is simulated to 
evaluate the performance improvement. Figure 6.8 shows the results of 
Razor technique and present technique. As seen in the figure, the present 
technique provides little less performance improvement compared to 
Razor technique and this is due to the fixed phase delay of the clock signal. 
This limitation can be improved by using tuneable phase delay element to 
capture late arrival data and to mask timing errors. However, this has an 
impact on area overhead and power overhead. 
(MHz) 
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Figure 6.8: Comparison of present technique performance improvement to 
the original design and Razor technique. 
In this work, simulated different benchmarks to evaluate the performance 
improvement of the present technique. The results of the three benchmarks 
are presented in Figure 6.9. From the results, it is evident that the present 
technique provides approximately 20% performance improvement 
compared with the original design. 
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Figure 6.9: Performance improvement of various benchmarks using 
present technique 
Also evaluated the present technique power overhead involved in dealing 
with error detection and correction. The original two stage design is run 
with voltage fixed to 1.0v and frequency is varied to measure total power 
consumption of the design with Razor and present technique. One 
frequency is chosen below the worst case frequency estimated by the 
timing analysis and the other frequency is selected beyond the worst case 
clock frequency. The idea here is to evaluate the power consumption of the 
present technique when there are no timing errors and in the presence of 
timing errors. Results of both techniques, power consumption vs. 
frequency are presented in Figure 6.10. In both cases Razor technique 
consumes more power compared to the present technique. Though Razor 
technique provides little better performance improvements compared to 
the present technique, Razor consumes more power before and after 
timing error occurrences. The present technique consumes less power, 
providing approximately 10% more power savings than the original design 
   Without present technique 
   With present technique 
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in the case of frequency less than the worst-case estimate. The savings are 
improved by 3 times by using the proposed techniques in the case of 
frequency after the worst-case estimate. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.10: Power consumption of Razor and present technique 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, a novel technique is presented to reduce the excessive 
timing margins, thus to reduce the power consumption of embedded 
systems. The present technique corrects the timing error caused by 
aggressive voltage/frequency scaling by phase delaying the clock. The 
main benefits of the technique are less area, power and design overheads 
compared with other latest techniques. The technique is validated by 
prototyping on to an FPGA in a Spartan 3E FPGA development board. 
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Results are presented to indicate the performance improvements and 
power consumption of the present technique. 
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CHAPTER 7  
 
Proposed Countermeasure Based on Aggressive 
Scaling for Security against DPA Attacks 
 
Differential power analysis attacks [19] are the main concern to embedded 
systems’ security. Even without knowing much information about the 
system, the attacks can be successful. The process is initiated by measuring 
the power consumption followed by estimating the hypothetical power 
consumption of the device. The next step involves comparison of the 
measured and estimated power models to extract the secret information 
contained in a chip or system. This chapter provides the practical 
realization of such attacks on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
implemented on an FPGA based system. Also includes the experimental 
setup used, statistical analysis of the captured power traces to reveal the 
secret key information. The implementation of the proposed 
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countermeasure along with AES encryption and comparison of results 
with and without countermeasure are also presented. 
The experimental investigation was carried out to perform power analysis 
attacks and their prototype on a PIC based system was discussed in 
chapter 4. In general, a set of worst- case operating conditions are outlined 
for digital ICs during their fabrication, under which the designed IC must 
work. To avail better power savings, the system must be operated beyond 
the worst-case estimates. The techniques to address this issue and the 
findings of chapter 3 are used in the design and development of the 
proposed countermeasure. Moreover, the selection of the most suitable 
frequency or voltage for the proposed aggressive scaling countermeasure 
depends mainly on the worst-case values estimated by the CAD tools. A 
scheduler is modelled to effectively decide the operating frequency by 
considering the feedback information from the proposed unit and the 
worst-case estimates. The complete setup helps to monitor the behaviour 
of the critical path of the design as the operating conditions vary. In 
addition, to successfully perform the attacks, the hypothetical power 
model need to be developed, which must be as close to the actual power 
traces of the system under test as possible.  
 
7.1 Device Power Consumption vs Attacks 
In order to effectively address the issues of DVFS as a countermeasure, it is 
helpful to analyse and understand the basic concepts of power 
consumption and the relation between power and leakage of information. 
             
 
         (7-1) 
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As shown by Equation (7-1), dynamic power consumption of a CMOS 
device depends on the load capacitance, operating voltage and frequency. 
Scaling down frequency helps reducing power but it affects performance. 
Depending on the computational task, the processor must intelligently 
choose the appropriate frequency to avoid running the system always at a 
high speed clock. Reducing operating voltage has a major impact on 
dynamic power because of the quadratic relation between voltage and 
power. Moreover, static power can be minimized by reducing the operating 
voltage. Hence voltage scaling is the most effective and commonly used 
technique.  
In terms of security, the device power consumption is the main source of 
leakage. From Equation (7-1), the power consumed by a device depends on 
the supply voltage and operating frequency. The main task of improving 
security from power attacks can happen by reducing the correlation 
between the power and internal computation. In order to accomplish this, 
either voltage or frequency should be scaled during the tasks.  The most 
suitable technique for doing this is DVFS and it is proposed as one of the 
best countermeasures to DPA attacks. 
 
7.2 Problems with Related Work and Motivation 
In [102], an interesting study on using DVFS as a countermeasure for DPA 
attacks is presented by Yang. The traditional DVFS is used to reduce power 
consumption of processor designs. But in this study, DVFS is proposed 
against all kinds of power attacks, which provides randomness in power as 
voltage and frequency are changed between different operating modes. In 
addition to this, an advanced control algorithm proposed in the work to 
introduce more randomness in the design, by creating long random 
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waiting time between the switchovers of the operating modes. The control 
algorithm and DVFS was able to reduce the relation between the power 
traces, while providing energy reduction of approximately 27%. However, 
the real validation of the technique by prototyping on hardware was not 
discussed. 
Another study proposed by Baddam et al. [103], delivers a random DVS 
technique to provide an effective countermeasure. Baddam emphasizes 
that using the same voltage and frequency pairs as in DVFS will not 
improve the immunity of DPA attacks. The study reports that the linear 
relation between voltage and frequency would result in easy estimation of 
(v,f) pairs, thus, results in information leakage. Also, it suggests that the 
scaling of either voltage or frequency is the best option to improve 
robustness of the design from attacks.  
Naga et al. [10] proposed an aggressive voltage scaling based on the 
outcomes of the work in [10] . But the drawbacks of the technique are Vmax 
and Fmax depend on tcd (contamination delay) and %error rate. The error 
detection and correction circuitry increases with tcd, which causes 
additional area overhead.  
On the other hand, the hardware based countermeasures include data 
masking techniques, re-configurable crypto processors [104]-[106], pseudo 
random based architecture to generate random sequence [107], ring 
oscillator approach [110], leakage based analysis [108], 109]. All these 
techniques improve resistance of the devices from DPA attacks but involve 
extra design and power overheads. 
To overcome the drawbacks of the mentioned techniques, a new timing 
error detection and correction circuit based on time-borrowing feature is 
proposed. With this technique, the following are achieved 
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 the linear relation between V and F is broken; 
 increased operating range; Vmax and Fmax range is increased, so 
randomness also increased; 
 No error correction overhead; as soon as the error detected, the 
phase delayed clock is used to capture the late arrival data. 
 
7.3 Hardware Realization of Random Dynamic Voltage 
and Frequency Scaling  
Yang [102] first proposed the usage of DVFS to improve the resistance of 
embedded systems to DPA attacks. The correlation between power 
consumption and internal computations can be reduced by varying the 
supply voltage and frequency randomly. 
The hardware realization of DVFS involves an open loop structure, which 
pre-determines different voltage and frequency pairs by considering all 
process corners and stores these values as a look-up table. Depending on 
the application task requirements, the appropriate (v,f) pairs are selected. 
As mentioned in chapter 2, the drawback of this approach towards power 
consumptions is that the system is not able to adapt to the changing needs 
of modern computing world. Similarly, for improving resistance from DPA 
attacks, the approach is not suitable because once frequency is known to 
the attacker, it is very easy to calculate the corresponding voltage level.   
7.4 Necessity for Aggressive Scaling Techniques 
As discussed in chapter 5, further to DVFS, many techniques proposed to 
improve energy efficiency, the AVS technique is getting more attention. 
The AVS technique scales the supply voltage beyond the worst case 
estimates to remove the excess timing margins. In general, processors use 
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typical operating conditions to guarantee safe operation. But systems are 
designed to operate in the worst case scenarios, which are very rare to 
occur. To safeguard the operation, the system designers consider excess 
timing margins. These excess timing margins limit the systems from 
having better performance and reduced power consumption.  
In [31], proposed Razor technique which works on the principle of 
aggressive mechanisms with a critical path monitor. The technique 
monitors critical paths in the design as voltage/ frequency is scaled. The 
purpose of monitoring critical path helps the system to fix the required 
operating frequency and voltage for the present task. The CAD tools 
generally estimate the typical values for any design. Going beyond the 
estimates of CAD tools remove the excess timing margins and make the 
systems benefit for maximum performance enhancement or power 
savings. 
The main task involved in AVS systems is not only to make the systems 
work beyond the typical estimated values but also to make the systems to 
perform stable and reliable operation. Many techniques have been 
proposed related to aggressive and stable voltage scaling techniques. 
TEAtime [55] uses critical path replica to estimate the critical path 
behaviour as frequency/ voltage is scaled. The critical path estimation 
techniques are really useful because these techniques estimate the error 
before it actually happens. As a result, there is no need to halt the 
instruction execution because of the error. However the major drawback of 
these techniques is how well the replica resembles the actual critical path. 
Similarly, DVFS technique has problems towards security improvement of 
systems. To address the problems, the above mentioned aggressive scaling 
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mechanisms are exploited to break the linear relationship between two 
important variable frequency and voltage. 
7.5 Problem Formulation 
The goal of the work presented in this chapter is to introduce randomness 
to power consumption by increasing the available number of operating 
states and by breaking the linear relation between voltage and frequency. 
The Pearson correlation coefficient is the one element that reveals the 
relation between two variables   and  . 
       
       
             
     (7-2) 
Cov is the co-variance of the two variables and Var is the variance. 
Using DVFS as a countermeasure [111], the coefficient can be changed as 
shown below: 
                       
 
               
   
  
 
             
 
       (7-3) 
 
Here        = real power measurements when system using DVFS; n = 
number of possible (v, f) pairs;           = hypothetical power model; 
From Equation (7-3), It is clear that the correlation coefficient relies on the 
number of (v, f) pairs and the information leakage at each particular (v, f) 
pair. 
             
    
   
    
  
      (7-4) 
The hypothetical model is calculated using Hamming weight, as in 
Equation (7-4). The coefficient is high only when   = . This condition must 
not be true for all the cases. To make this work, the hypothetical power 
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model should not leak the information about the voltage and frequency 
levels.  If the attacker can guess the correct operating frequency of the 
encryption, the corresponding voltage can be easily calculated from the 
Equation (7-5), based on their linear relationship. Here (vi’, fi’) are the new 
set of voltage and frequency values and m is the slope of the linear curve; 
(vold, fold) are the previous set of voltage and frequency values; 
  
  
   
       
 
            (7-5) 
To make the traditional DVFS as a countermeasure, the relation between 
voltage and frequency must be broken. 
From [90] the number of samples required to estimate in a DPA attack 
depends on ρmax, the maximum correlation value. 
             (7-6) 
With DVFS, the required number of samples is changed to  
                (7-7) 
From Equation (7-7), increasing the number of possible (v, f) pairs, n, 
increases the number of samples required to attack the system. 
Therefore, the goal of the work is to have an increased number of (v, f) 
pairs, which makes difficult to make DPA successful and to break the 
relation between voltage and frequency. 
 
7.6 Circuit Architecture and Features 
The architecture of our circuit is shown in Figure 7.1. 
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Figure 7.1: The circuit diagram of the proposed technique 
 
 Flip-flop and latch combination used to detect any timing violations.  
 Once detected, flip-flop clock is phase delayed to capture the late 
arrival data. 
 Enable is used to enable /disable time borrowing approach 
 Flip-flop clock is generated beforehand only selection done on the fly 
To break the linear relation between voltage and frequency, aggressive 
voltage/frequency scaling can be used. AVS systems must operate beyond 
the worst case estimates yet providing reliable operation. To make this 
possible, the systems must use timing error detection and correction 
circuit. The timing errors might occur going beyond the worst case values 
to reduce timing margins. 
Using AFS/AVS, at each (v, f) pair voltage or frequency can be varied to 
break the linear relationship. At each (v, f) pair, either voltage or frequency 
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can be varied by keeping the other constant. For example, AFS technique 
involves frequency variation by keeping voltage constant. 
7.7 Benefits of Mixed Random Dynamic Voltage and 
Frequency Scaling 
By considering all the issues and benefits of traditional DVFS approach, 
randomization countermeasure and AVS/AFS, a new technique called 
Mixed Random Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling (MRDVFS) is 
proposed.  The technique introduces randomness by four factors: 
 the number of states 
 voltage or frequency 
 Magnitude; voltage or frequency values are selected depending on 
error rate 
 Up or Down 
Using DVFS, the possible number of operating modes is shown in Figure 
7.2.  The procedure for implementation of the proposed technique is 
illustrated in Figure 7.3. Out of all the possible states, one operating mode 
is selected randomly. The selection of operating mode is happening 
randomly to introduce randomness to the countermeasure. However, this 
is not sufficient to improve immunity. As a result, to increase the 
randomness of the countermeasure, above 4 factors are considered. 
Instead of running at the selected pair (v, f), the next task is deciding to 
increase either voltage or frequency. The architecture needs to provide 
provision to vary both. For one encryption round, voltage can be selected 
and for the next round frequency can be selected. Therefore, the technique 
has been named as mixed random dynamic voltage and frequency scaling. 
Tradition approach varies both voltage and frequency at each state. This 
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approach varies either voltage or frequency at each stage depends on the 
selection. 
After the selection of voltage or frequency, the next job is finding the value 
of the voltage or frequency. The direction of variation can go up or down. 
The possible outcomes are V + ∆V, V - ∆V.  If V - ∆V is selected, the 
operating mode still operates in the operating zone; hence the circuit 
performs normal operation. If V + ∆Vis selected, the circuit goes into the 
non-operating zone. To perform a safe and reliable operation, the circuit 
needs to employ a timing error detection circuitry. The same can be used 
for frequency variation. Further, the selection of values is done by 
considering the timing error rate and the circuit capability to handle the 
errors. 
 
Figure 7.2: Voltage- frequency graph for DVFS and AVS or AFS 
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Figure 7.3: Implementation of mixed random multi-dynamic voltage and 
frequency scaling 
7.8 Experimental Methodology 
The same differential power analysis scheme, shown in Figure 7.4 is 
reproduced on an experimental platform with AES hardware 
implementation on Spartan 3E FPGA. The best and fast suitable 
environment for prototyping is the FPGA and to evaluate the performance 
of the technique [112][110]-[117]. Real output is the measurements 
captured from FPGA board while running encryption. Hypothetical output 
is calculated using Hamming weight method and Matlab software. 
Correlation power analysis is applied to measure the correlation between 
the real measured power and hypothetical power values. 
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Figure 7.4: Block diagram of the correlation power analysis attacks  
The experimental setup used for this work is shown in Figure 7.5. This 
section provides the methodology used for our experiments to implement 
DPA attacks along with AES algorithm.  
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Figure 7.5: Experimental setup used (a) Captured power traces using 
oscilloscope, (b) Xilinx Spartan 3E FPGA development board, (c) Snapshot 
of the setup, (d)Successful programming of FPGA, (e) Captured power 
traces from oscilloscope to PC  
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7.9 Hardware Configuration 
The Spartan 3E FPGA development board is used for implementing the 
attacks, so Spartan 3E FPGA acts as the device under test. The most 
advanced encryption algorithm, AES is implemented on FPGA using 
VHDL. The board contains a 50 MHz on chip crystal oscillator, which acts 
as a base clock frequency. Using digital clock manager (DCM), different set 
of frequencies under AFS scheme are generated. To have enough number 
of samples, the AES is run at 5 MHz, dividing down the base clock 
frequency by 10. Another advantage of the board is having current sense 
feature on jumpers jp6 and jp7. In general, FPGA devices have three power 
supplies; one for I/O blocks; one for the peripherals and the last one for 
the internal logic. To measure power consumption of the FPGA, the 
internal logic supply must be used. The power consumption of the device 
is measured across the resistor and captured using oscilloscope. A trigger 
signal is created to synchronise the power consumption traces with the 
corresponding input data.  
7.10 AES Sbox Implementation 
AES Sbox implemented in VHDL and simulated using Xilinx simulation 
and verified the functional correctness. Figure 7.6 depicts the block 
diagram of the proposed technique with Sbox. To implement AFS scheme, 
three additional blocks are added to the original 8-bit Sbox. 1) Scheduler, 2) 
random number generation, 3) proposed timing error monitor. The 
scheduler decides the operating frequency and voltage based on the task 
requirements and timing monitor feedback. The random generator selects 
a state from the available number of voltage-frequency pairs. The proposed 
monitor detects timing error whenever there is a timing violation.  
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At each clock cycle, the state decided and frequency varied from the pre-
calculated one. As a result, the number of states has increased when 
compared to the traditional DVFS to increase the randomness. For 
example, the typical operating zone is (1, 8.069 GHz). Using AFS, 
frequency can be varied with a swing of 0.05 GHz, which results in 
possible two states of (1, 8.019 GHz) and (1, 8.119). Note that the voltage is 
kept constant. Using AVS, voltage can be varied with a swing of 0.2v 
keeping frequency constant. The possible states can be (0.8v, 8.069GHz) 
and (1.2v, 8.069GHz). 
 
Figure 7.6: Block diagram of Sbox with proposed technique 
 
The proposed technique validated by using AFS mechanism because both 
either AFS or AVS result in timing errors. The key idea is that the 
technique needs to detect the timing errors and handle them with safe 
operation. Another reason for choosing AFS is there is no need to alter the 
hardware in order to verify the proposed technique. Using PLLs, the 
required frequency is achieved in each state. The AFS allows the frequency 
to increase from the worst case estimation. As a result, the critical path in 
the design executes more delay than the new clock period. Hence, timing 
errors start to appear. The CAD tool estimated the worst case delay as 2.5 
ns. As discussed earlier, no timing errors occurred up to this point. As 
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frequency scaled further, it causes timing violations and thus timing errors. 
However, it provides a performance improvement of 20 %. Another 
consideration here is that the rate of increase in frequency is more that the 
rate of increase in timing error rate. 
The timing monitor unit detects the error as soon as it occurs. The whole 
system must handle the errors without any performance loss. The idea is 
that the system must be error tolerant while providing maximum 
performance. The unit not only detects the error but also self corrects it 
without timing penalty. With the help of the proposed unit, the system 
enable to operate beyond the worst case estimates yet providing a reliable 
and stable operation.  
7.11 Procedure 
The proposed technique replaces flip-flop at each pipeline stage of a 
processor. In general, for a 5-stage pipeline processor consists of 
instruction fetch, instructions decode, execution stage, memory access 
stage and write back stage. Flip-flops at each stage have been replaced with 
the proposed technique to monitor errors at each stage. In this case, for 
AES Sbox design, the flip-flop in the design replaced with the technique to 
monitor and recover the timing errors as shown in Figure 7.6. 
With the number of states of (v, f) pairs, random generator block chooses a 
state every clock cycle feeds it to the scheduler unit. The scheduler decides 
the frequency based on complete signal and proposed unit’s feedback. The 
new clock frequency information is fed to the PLL unit to generate the 
required frequency to run the AES encryption algorithm. The function 
verification of the whole design is done by using Xilinx simulation tool and 
downloaded to the FPGA. The power traces while running encryption 
algorithm are measured using oscilloscope.  
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7.12 Power Analysis Attacks 
 To validate the technique as an effective countermeasure, the power 
analysis attacks have to be performed on the implemented Sbox. 
A set of plain texts are encrypted using number of keys to generate cipher 
texts;  
A = {a1, a2, a3…anp} here np = number of plain texts 
K = {k1, k2, k3…knk} nk = number of keys 
                              (7-8) 
With the above calculation, all subsets of inputs and keys are used to 
generate a matrix with the order of np * nk.   
C (n p, nk) = 
 
 
 
 
 
                    
            …        
    
    
                        
 
 
 
 
      (7-9) 
 
The above cipher text calculation is done by varying frequency and 
voltage. Hence it is changed to: 
                                      
 (7-10) 
Here (vi, Fj) corresponds to different voltage and frequency pairs. The 
entire cipher text matrix calculation was done by changing frequency for 
each element in the matrix. The hypothetical power model is done by 
looking at the 1-0s and 0-1s transition of Sbox output. 
P = Hamming weight (Sbox(A XOR K)) . The cipher text matrix is formed 
as power model matrix, the size of both matrices are the same. Real power 
consumption is measured for each plaintext and formed a matrix with real 
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power traces with dimensions as np X nt.  Here np = number of plain texts 
and nt = number of samples. 
P (nd,nt) = 
 
 
 
 
 
                    
            …        
    
    
                        
 
 
 
 
     (7-11) 
The correlation coefficient reveals the relation between these two variables 
T and P. if T and P are matched, the correlation coefficient is high and low 
indicates that the two elements are not identical. 
To measure correlation, first consider first row of the hypothetical power 
model and then the first column of the real power traces. 
    Xj  j €     np  ; Xj = [p (1, j), p (2, j), p (3, j) … p (np, j)] T 
Yt (t €     nt     Yt = [T (1, t) T (2, t) T (3, t) … T(nt, t)]                (7-12) 
    
The above concept extended to AFS approach in that case Xj contains set of 
data operating at different voltage and frequency pairs. The calculation of 
correlation coefficient must be modified accordingly.  
              
  
            
 
   
    
     
      (7-13) 
The countermeasure is more effective if the correlation coefficient is small; 
that means the relation between Xj and Yt are not related to each other. The 
attacker needs to predict the exact (v, f) pairs used for input data to have 
higher correlation coefficients. 
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7.13 Results 
The results presented in this section are dedicated to test the robustness of 
the proposed countermeasure. The simulation results of correlation 
analysis with and without countermeasure for all possible key values are 
listed in Appendix A. 
The maximum operating frequency of AES encryption suggested by CAD 
tools is 400 MHz. Since the countermeasure allows the system to operate 
beyond the worst case estimates, the operating frequency extended up to 
540 MHz. The performance improvements offered by the other techniques 
presented in Figure 7.7. The proposed countermeasure provides significant 
improvement compared with other techniques. 
To verify the effectiveness of the technique, statistical analysis is performed 
on the measured power traces and hypothetical power traces. The 
correlation coefficient reveals the relation between the two traces.  Figure 
7.8 shows the peaks for correct key (94, 112) respectively with the 
countermeasure. Figure 7.9 shows the peaks for the same keys (94, 112) 
without any countermeasure. It is clearly evident that the peaks 
corresponding to the correct keys are high without any countermeasure. 
Adding countermeasure makes difficult to detect the correct key. 
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Figure 7.7: Performance improvement of present technique 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
AES AES + Razor AES + present
N
o
rm
a
li
se
d
 P
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
ce
132 
 
-
 
Figure 7.8: Correlation coefficient for correct keys 112d, 94d with 
countermeasure 
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Figure 7.9: Correlation coefficient for correct keys 112d, 94d without any 
countermeasure 
 
Figure 7.10: Performance improvement of various benchmarks using 
present technique 
Different benchmarks have been simulated to evaluate the performance 
improvement of the present technique. The results of the three benchmarks 
are presented in Figure 7.10. From the results, it is evident that the present 
technique provides approximately 20% performance improvement 
compared with the original design. 
   Without present technique 
   With present technique 
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Figure 7.11 shows the comparison of power savings of the present 
technique and other techniques with frequency below and after worst-case 
frequency. The present technique consumes less power, providing 
approximately 12% more power savings than the original design in the 
case of frequency less than the worst-case estimate. The savings are 
improved by 3 times by using the proposed techniques in the case of 
frequency after the worst-case estimate.  Figure 7.12 illustrates the power 
savings of the present technique. The power consumption of AES circuit is 
5.3mW with 1V supply voltage at 200 MHz operating frequency. With the 
countermeasure, the power is reduced to 4.9mW with 1V supply voltage 
and varying frequency. Note that the countermeasure provides more 
savings with the reduction of supply voltage. 
 
Figure 7.11: Power consumption of Razor and present technique 
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Figure 7.12: Power savings of present technique 
Overall, the countermeasure provides more performance and power 
reductions compared to other aggressive scaling techniques. Less area 
overhead compared with other DPA countermeasures 
 
7.14 Summary 
In this chapter, a novel technique is presented to improve the immunity of 
embedded systems from DPA attacks. The presented countermeasure 
randomly varies voltage while keeping frequency constant or frequency 
while keeping voltage constant. Using this method, in case of frequency 
scaling, performance can be pushed further to exploit data heterogeneity. 
Further, the technique reduces the correlation coefficient for the correct key 
and improves it for the wrong keys. Also, the technique has less area 
overhead, power overhead and design overhead compared with other 
techniques. The proposed countermeasure is implemented in VHDL and 
downloaded on to the SPARTRAN 3E FPGA to evaluate it. Results are 
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provided to indicate the proposed technique improved immunity, 
performance improvement and ultra-power savings. 
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CHAPTER 8  
 
Conclusions and Future Work 
 
This chapter presents the conclusions of this research work and the 
possible future directions to extend the work further.  
8.1 Conclusions of the Thesis 
Smart and portable devices with limited battery supply require efficient 
power management techniques to extend the battery life. Supplementing 
the system power management and deciding to go for the low power 
modes when the system is idle is one way of offering power savings. A 
novel technique based on aggressive scaling is proposed in this work to 
address the issues of power efficiency and security. The aggressive scaling 
technique employs critical path monitor to extend the boundaries and to 
operate systems beyond the safety margins. This work identifies that 
monitoring of the critical path while frequency or voltage is scaling to a 
level exceeding the nominal values is important, not only for the efficient 
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use of excess margins but also for the stable and reliable operation of the 
system. These properties were realised by exploiting the critical path of the 
design as the main control input to the aggressive scaling unit. Using this 
method, the proposed technique detects and self-corrects the timing error 
to resume normal operation without much timing penalty. 
The first objective of power efficiency is achieved by developing an 
aggressive scaling unit using an effective critical path monitor as the 
control trigger, as covered in chapter 5. The valuable property of sequential 
elements was employed in the critical path monitor design to detect real-
time timing errors. The method was defined in such a way that the timing 
errors start to occur when the frequency or voltage is scaled above 
threshold levels. Once the error occurred, the proposed technique uses 
phase delayed clock to self-correct the error. In this way, the aggressive 
unit provides normal operation beyond the safety limits. As a requirement, 
the error detection and correction circuit should experience smooth 
transition of operating modes by using advanced PLL and on-chip power 
supply units to supply the required levels. The stability of the error 
detection circuit was found to depend on the number of timing error 
occurred and the operating frequency and voltage of the original design. 
However, these values can be pre-evaluated by using advanced CAD tools.  
The main benefits of the technique are less area, power and design 
overheads compared with the other latest techniques. The technique is 
validated by prototyping on to an FPGA in a Spartan 3E FPGA 
development board, as presented in chapter 5. Results show that the 
system can provide performance improvement of 20% or power savings of 
30%.  
The second objective is to improve the security of systems from power 
analysis attacks. These attacks are becoming more popular because of the 
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ease of their implementation. Also, devices are shared over a network 
known as IoT [14] is emerging. The security of these devices is becoming a 
major research challenge. To address this, researchers have proposed many 
techniques at different levels of abstraction. In this thesis, an effective 
countermeasure has been developed with less area, power and design 
overheads by considering the drawbacks of the previously reported 
countermeasures. The proposed countermeasure works on the principle of 
the earlier proposed aggressive scaling to improve the immunity of 
systems from DPA attacks. Like DVFS, aggressive scaling can also be used 
to introduce randomness in the power consumption. This prevents the 
attackers extracting the secret information by analysing the power leakage 
from the systems. The proposed technique (MRDVFS), uses not only the 
voltage or frequency variation but also the values can go up or down to 
add more randomness to the power profile, as discussed in detail in 
chapter 6.  The latest encryption algorithm, AES is used to evaluate the 
resistance of the proposed circuit from DPA attacks. As a platform to 
design, develop and test the aggressive scaling unit as an effective 
countermeasure, a complete prototype model to replicate power analysis 
attacks was developed as detailed in chapter 4. The model simulated with 
encryption algorithm, proposed technique with PLL and controller; and 
downloaded on to the FPGA prototype board to capture real power traces. 
Statistical techniques are also implemented in Matlab to create hypothetical 
model and to compare this with real values to extract the hidden 
information. 
Similarly, for validating the proposed power optimized circuit design 
experimentally, using the FPGA board with Spartan 3E FPGA was 
presented in chapter 4. In addition, results provided to indicate that the 
technique improves resistance of the system from DPA attacks. Further, 
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the technique provides performance improvements of approximately 20% 
and power savings of 30%, as presented in chapter 6. 
8.2 Limitations and Future Work 
The present research work could be extended in several directions. The 
following paragraphs introduce some limitations and relevant areas of 
future research.   
One limitation is that the meta-stability circuit design is not considered in 
the proposed technique. The reason for this is the availability of meta-
stable detectors, presented in [31] [55], [57]. The circuits can be added 
directly to the proposed aggressive scaling unit to overcome the stability 
issues. 
This work was developed for single processor-core designs. The future 
work can include extending the architecture further to the multi-core 
processors or heterogeneous systems. Depending on the requirements, 
appropriate changes can be made to suit to the multi-core architectures to 
trade off performance and power consumption.  In that case, the design 
need to evaluate in terms of area, power and design overheads. A more in-
depth analysis on the state of the proposed aggressive scaling design may 
be beneficial for the multi-core processors power optimization in addition 
to the overheads involved.  
Further, Integration of the present error correction and detection 
framework into an existing, commerical static timing analyser that 
calculates the worst case estimates after removal of the excess timing 
margins. However, this work poses several challenges to be widely 
accepted by the commercial CAD tools.  
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APPENDIX A 
Table A.1 Simulation results of correlation analysis with countermeasure; 
correlation coefficients for all possible keys (94, 112 used as keys) 
Serial No Key = 112, with correlation Key = 94, with correlation 
0 0.2716 0.2264 
1 0.3019 0.1318 
2 0.0423 0.1225 
3 0.3045 0.3293 
4 0.2108 0.0126 
5 0.0325 0.2951 
6 0.0928 0.3044 
7 0.1823 0.2654 
8 0.3192 0.0329 
9 0.3216 0.0873 
10 0.0525 0.1118 
11 0.3235 0.2266 
12 0.3191 0.0455 
13 0.1618 0.2404 
14 0.2668 0.0356 
15 0.0473 0.2179 
16 0.1406 0.1647 
17 0.3052 0.2597 
18 0.2641 0.2383 
19 0.3198 0.3012 
20 0.2186 0.297 
21 0.0119 0.1114 
22 0.283 0.2329 
23 0.3113 0.0659 
24 0.2262 0.0102 
25 0.2526 0.248 
26 0.2477 0.1667 
27 0.1307 0.16 
28 0.2185 0.3016 
29 0.0571 0.2033 
30 0.2353 0.2059 
   Continued on next page.. 
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page 
Serial No Key = 112, with correlation Key = 94, with correlation 
31 0.0106 0.2865 
32 0.0923 0.2685 
33 0.57 0.1922 
34 0.0324 0.061 
35 0.2745 0.08 
36 0.2316 0.2955 
37 0.1057 0.0096 
38 0.3167 0.1633 
39 0.0115 0.056 
40 0.1462 0.3262 
41 0.1272 0.2376 
42 0.2552 0.1668 
43 0.2651 0.157 
44 0.0623 0.75 
45 0.1633 0.2273 
46 0.1485 0.0141 
47 0.2154 0.0238 
48 0.2365 0.1739 
49 0.2516 0.0322 
50 0.092 0.2727 
51 0.2266 0.2725 
52 0.2184 0.2408 
53 0.0542 0.05 
54 0.0397 0.2199 
55 0.7 0.1729 
56 0.3199 0.3243 
57 0.1135 0.2163 
58 0.1951 0.2668 
59 0.0746 0.1513 
60 0.2504 0.1441 
Continued on next page.. 
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page 
Serial No Key = 112, with correlation Key = 94, with correlation 
61 0.085 0.2751 
62 0.1687 0.0278 
63 0.233 0.0444 
64 0.297 0.0578 
65 0.3198 0.1303 
66 0.1824 0.2771 
67 0.0462 0.2678 
68 0.0498 0.0202 
69 0.0858 0.1331 
70 0.2802 0.1756 
71 0.0848 0.1389 
72 0.2714 0.219 
73 0.0812 0.2093 
74 0.3098 0.0973 
75 0.1167 0.1439 
76 0.0655 0.0052 
77 0.0837 0.328 
78 0.2053 0.0557 
79 0.1578 0.0354 
80 0.1172 0.1241 
81 0.2769 0.066 
82 0.1951 0.1632 
83 0.1832 0.1132 
84 0.3057 0.3172 
85 0.0953 0.3068 
86 0.2524 0.0176 
87 0.2512 0.246 
88 0.1268 0.0897 
89 0.1893 0.1409 
90 0.0253 0.1826 
Continued on next page.. 
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page 
Serial No Key = 112, with correlation Key = 94, with correlation 
91 0.018 0.3142 
92 0.1769 0.1392 
93 0.2597 0.3277 
94 0.3113 0.1005 
95 0.0433 0.2337 
96 0.1896 0.2221 
97 0.1565 0.1797 
98 0.004 0.2327 
99 0.1124 0.2222 
100 0.0541 0.0594 
101 0.2648 0.0427 
102 0.1037 0.333 
103 0.1762 0.057 
104 0.0552 0.0109 
105 0.2007 0.1871 
106 0.0877 0.294 
107 0.218 0.2231 
108 0.2297 0.0635 
109 0.2494 0.123 
110 0.1502 0.1536 
111 0.0279 0.3272 
112 0.0763 0.0521 
113 0.3044 0.2852 
114 0.0508 0.2149 
115 0.2753 0.1254 
116 0.1794 0.0636 
117 0.332 0.1428 
118 0.0261 0.1607 
119 0.1476 0.6 
120 0.0356 0.1965 
Continued on next page.. 
157 
 
Table A.1 – continued from previous page 
Serial No Key = 112, with correlation Key = 94, with correlation 
121 0.3206 0.0754 
122 0.0015 0.1282 
123 0.2583 0.1943 
124 0.2724 0.0839 
125 0.2896 0.0968 
126 0.0281 0.2057 
127 0.1333 0.0884 
128 0.0866 0.2748 
129 0.2667 0.3276 
130 0.1438 0.2434 
131 0.3035 0.1146 
132 0.0606 0.1947 
133 0.0879 0.0359 
134 0.0485 0.3021 
135 0.0454 0.2932 
136 0.2898 0.2726 
137 0.1932 0.0869 
138 0.1833 0.1981 
139 0.0483 0.0075 
140 0.2843 0.1418 
141 0.2074 0.1042 
142 0.117 0.0538 
143 0.1711 0.0596 
144 0.1339 0.141 
145 0.0253 0.0314 
146 0.08 0.1995 
147 0.0411 0.157 
148 0.0613 0.232 
149 0.08 0.2333 
150 0.1391 0.2128 
Continued on next page.. 
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page 
Serial No Key = 112, with correlation Key = 94, with correlation 
151 0.0166 0.0112 
152 0.3009 0.0229 
153 0.3149 0.1065 
154 0.1636 0.177 
155 0.1631 0.2181 
156 0.1126 0.1359 
157 0.3 0.2733 
158 0.1231 0.2395 
159 0.0371 0.3229 
160 0.2601 0.1771 
161 0.1299 0.1084 
162 0.0806 0.0352 
163 0.1346 0.2037 
164 0.0322 0.2596 
165 0.044 0.1412 
166 0.314 0.0303 
167 0.3187 0.0888 
168 0.1917 0.0512 
169 0.0199 0.0937 
170 0.0783 0.1467 
171 0.1177 0.1757 
172 0.2737 0.1525 
173 0.0051 0.2918 
174 0.64 0.1727 
175 0.0563 0.3145 
176 0.2164 0.2126 
177 0.2439 0.3192 
178 0.2159 0.0802 
179 0.1503 0.2254 
180 0.1823 0.0964 
Continued on next page.. 
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page 
Serial No Key = 112, with correlation Key = 94, with correlation 
181 0.0988 0.2239 
182 0.2482 0.2317 
183 0.063 0.0227 
184 0.2289 0.0849 
185 0.0612 0.0747 
186 0.1228 0.2226 
187 0.2085 0.2815 
188 0.2601 0.1148 
189 0.027 0.2602 
190 0.3098 0.2251 
191 0.2586 0.0022 
192 0.1623 0.2007 
193 0.1453 0.1289 
194 0.1489 0.3053 
195 0.1021 0.0004 
196 0.1695 0.1541 
197 0.1703 0.1414 
198 0.2725 0.1536 
199 0.83 0.2567 
200 0.2148 0.1075 
201 0.1262 0.2616 
202 0.2705 0.1571 
203 0.1776 0.0119 
204 0.1169 0.0586 
205 0.313 0.2406 
206 0.292 0.1578 
207 0.1834 0.0509 
208 0.2075 0.1137 
209 0.1957 0.82 
210 0.0692 0.0639 
Continued on next page.. 
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page 
Serial No Key = 112, with correlation Key = 94, with correlation 
211 0.1004 0.2461 
212 0.157 0.0809 
213 0.0768 0.3058 
214 0.2814 0.0897 
215 0.0649 0.2552 
216 0.0753 0.0629 
217 0.0569 0.0958 
218 0.0759 0.0304 
219 0.1452 0.1921 
220 0.1037 0.2278 
221 0.3078 0.1822 
222 0.1434 0.1419 
223 0.0616 0.2148 
224 0.3016 0.2159 
225 0.3266 0.2263 
226 0.1463 0.2119 
227 0.037 0.3151 
228 0.086 0.0696 
229 0.1362 0.2364 
230 0.1983 0.0787 
231 0.0874 0.0398 
232 0.2009 0.2024 
233 0.2371 0.15 
234 0.0739 0.1529 
235 0.0391 0.2206 
236 0.0989 0.2568 
237 0.1063 0.1167 
238 0.1414 0.2207 
239 0.1693 0.1387 
240 0.0285 0.2806 
Continued on next page.. 
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page 
Serial No Key = 112, with correlation Key = 94, with correlation 
241 0.0875 0.2776 
242 0.267 0.0855 
243 0.0097 0.2045 
244 0.3096 0.1941 
245 0.2434 0.1802 
246 0.1629 0.29 
247 0.1928 0.0883 
248 0.0791 0.106 
249 0.1529 0.0397 
250 0.321 0.3133 
251 0.1823 0.2152 
252 0.1737 0.1598 
253 0.077 0.2131 
254  0.1737 0.1816 
255  0.1362 0.2158 
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Table A.2 Simulation results of correlation analysis without 
countermeasure; correlation coefficients for all possible keys (94, 112 used 
as keys) 
Serial No Key = 112, with correlation Key = 94, with correlation 
0 0.6292 0.1813 
1 0.3661 0.2403 
2 0.4856 0.1742 
3 0.3845 0.3312 
4 0.0172 0.0729 
5 0.2977 0.0353 
6 0.4309 0.0366 
7 0.3475 0.0212 
8 0.2482 0.1349 
9 0.6248 0.1495 
10 0.553 0.1219 
11 0.5661 0.2545 
12 0.2484 0.2093 
13 0.3955 0.2573 
14 0.5817 0.311 
15 0.6223 0.3242 
16 0.4456 0.064 
17 0.1379 0.0463 
18 0.4359 0.2321 
19 0.048 0.0313 
20 0.2712 0.1751 
21 0.4446 0.1768 
22 0.6225 0.287 
23 0.5406 0.1616 
24 0.323 0.1312 
25 0.5045 0.2238 
26 0.278 0.2471 
27 0.6479 0.1734 
28 0.6586 0.1159 
29 0.5761 0.05 
30 0.2593 0.1954 
Continued on next page... 
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page 
Serial No Key = 112, without correlation Key = 94, without correlation 
31 0.3032 0.0874 
32 0.1645 0.0148 
33 0.5229 0.2516 
34 0.5886 0.0809 
35 0.6091 0.1475 
36 0.3722 0.2293 
37 0.3992 0.1197 
38 0.0993 0.2454 
39 0.5998 0.1316 
40 0.3003 0.2278 
41 0.1371 0.2347 
42 0.5998 0.1474 
43 0.5084 0.0065 
44 0.5883 0.1103 
45 0.19 0.1414 
46 0.4488 0.0901 
47 0.4429 0.0657 
48 0.0819 0.2739 
49 0.2715 0.1433 
50 0.1835 0.2959 
51 0.4778 0.1304 
52 0.1889 0.2564 
53 0.5975 0.1323 
54 0.5511 0.2695 
55 0.26 0.2517 
56 0.3319 0.1258 
57 0.4632 0.072 
58 0.5562 0.2635 
59 0.4064 0.3164 
60 0.3832 0.1092 
Continued on next page... 
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page 
Serial No Key = 112, without correlation Key = 94, without correlation 
61 0.2174 0.2238 
62 0.3043 0.1462 
63 0.4759 0.2778 
64 0.5896 0.2563 
65 0.4806 0.0558 
66 0.0124 0.2873 
67 0.4499 0.33 
68 0.2923 0.1715 
69 0.2919 0.2948 
70 0.078 0.196 
71 0.5431 0.0516 
72 0.2166 0.0666 
73 0.1642 0.1357 
74 0.2285 0.2496 
75 0.2505 0.2752 
76 0.3644 0.2633 
77 0.3746 0.1062 
78 0.2639 0.178 
79 0.2654 0.03 
80 0.3436 0.0372 
81 0.4384 0.0454 
82 0.6339 0.2262 
83 0.4816 0.1651 
84 0.2667 0.0632 
85 0.5546 0.165 
86 0.0896 0.0492 
87 0.0403 0.0183 
88 0.0562 0.2836 
89 0.1093 0.1869 
90 0.2161 0.3099 
Continued on next page... 
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page 
Serial No Key = 112, with correlation Key = 94, with correlation 
91 0.2012 0.2322 
92 0.0078 0.1943 
93 0.3599 0.89 
94 0.0636 0.293 
95 0.0977 0.3296 
96 0.4208 0.0002 
97 0.5729 0.2885 
98 0.6495 0.2042 
99 0.3806 0.33 
100 0.6646 0.1759 
101 0.369 0.1598 
102 0.3436 0.2671 
103 0.2205 0.0759 
104 0.2867 0.166 
105 0.3279 0.3003 
106 0.0474 0.1916 
107 0.5918 0.2817 
108 0.0431 0.2462 
109 0.2908 0.1953 
110 0.5511 0.0822 
111 0.94 0.2221 
112 0.409 0.0278 
113 0.5458 0.2087 
114 0.5908 0.2203 
115 0.6207 0.2433 
116 0.1272 0.2969 
117 0.1724 0.3274 
118 0.5986 0.2563 
119 0.3956 0.1938 
120 0.3359 0.3094 
Continued on next page... 
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page 
Serial No Key = 112, with correlation Key = 94, with correlation 
121 0.4085 0.1934 
122 0.5463 0.0057 
123 0.3546 0.0403 
124 0.1347 0.2876 
125 0.3026 0.1614 
126 0.2853 0.2816 
127 0.644 0.0698 
128 0.4134 0.1841 
129 0.4636 0.21 
130 0.4801 0.0107 
131 0.2313 0.2049 
132 0.3447 0.1208 
133 0.3711 0.0165 
134 0.1043 0.1632 
135 0.3747 0.0642 
136 0.4632 0.041 
137 0.2843 0.0685 
138 0.5575 0.0488 
139 0.4876 0.063 
140 0.24 0.0142 
141 0.3028 0.2117 
142 0.2576 0.094 
143 0.517 0.1795 
144 0.4895 0.2317 
145 0.2869 0.1664 
146 0.4625 0.1786 
147 0.6301 0.1484 
148 0.5228 0.0413 
149 0.4704 0.1635 
150 0.0729 0.2843 
Continued on next page... 
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page 
Serial No Key = 112, with correlation Key = 94, with correlation 
151 0.26 0.2913 
152 0.3939 0.0901 
153 0.3063 0.0695 
154 0.0336 0.1883 
155 0.1525 0.2134 
156 0.5561 0.139 
157 0.0104 0.0687 
158 0.5758 0.316 
159 0.052 0.0274 
160 0.446 0.0352 
161 0.3335 0.0473 
162 0.1453 0.0555 
163 0.3811 0.207 
164 0.0815 0.1912 
165 0.4474 0.0174 
166 0.3997 0.3104 
167 0.0373 0.2429 
168 0.0376 0.2459 
169 0.1017 0.0211 
170 0.0131 0.2868 
171 0.2901 0.3115 
172 0.5548 0.3281 
173 0.4116 0.2863 
174 0.3468 0.2619 
175 0.5759 0.1711 
176 0.0651 0.0592 
177 0.6054 0.1329 
178 0.072 0.0446 
179 0.3447 0.0103 
180 0.0954 0.313 
Continued on next page... 
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page 
Serial No Key = 112, with correlation Key = 94, with correlation 
181 0.3729 0.1004 
182 0.0031 0.0985 
183 0.5111 0.111 
184 0.5658 0.1557 
185 0.6112 0.2161 
186 0.658 0.0084 
187 0.3368 0.2807 
188 0.1809 0.1863 
189 0.0672 0.2847 
190 0.3386 0.116 
191 0.3904 0.1487 
192 0.5086 0.0181 
193 0.0553 0.059 
194 0.4411 0.2209 
195 0.3447 0.1103 
196 0.114 0.2995 
197 0.6257 0.0394 
198 0.3937 0.3295 
199 0.2938 0.18 
200 0.6279 0.2356 
201 0.4373 0.3332 
202 0.3013 0.0959 
203 0.5598 0.1382 
204 0.3551 0.1549 
205 0.3693 0.2547 
206 0.4534 0.2727 
207 0.2448 0.0334 
208 0.1595 0.0594 
209 0.3859 0.1199 
210 0.5779 0.0189 
Continued on next page... 
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page 
Serial No Key = 112, with correlation Key = 94, with correlation 
211 0.2712 0.174 
212 0.0751 0.1119 
213 0.2959 0.0586 
214 0.2001 0.0696 
215 0.2676 0.3017 
216 0.5556 0.2251 
217 0.2691 0.1562 
218 0.2601 0.304 
219 0.2403 0.0347 
220 0.0935 0.2485 
221 0.1734 0.2454 
222 0.0579 0.1873 
223 0.2863 0.0614 
224 0.1715 0.1991 
225 0.1984 0.1 
226 0.2832 0.0447 
227 0.0795 0.0709 
228 0.33 0.2983 
229 0.4709 0.0238 
230 0.1624 0.0808 
231 0.5234 0.0179 
232 0.0494 0.1472 
233 0.2626 0.0044 
234 0.0023 0.2991 
235 0.1471 0.0656 
236 0.0009 0.0311 
237 0.1261 0.1025 
238 0.095 0.152 
239 0.1787 0.0339 
240 0.1166 0.3318 
Continued on next page... 
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page 
Serial No Key = 112, with correlation Key = 94, with correlation 
241 0.0924 0.1107 
242 0.3993 0.0991 
243 0.6007 0.0207 
244 0.6263 0.0994 
245 0.1475 0.0155 
246 0.3218 0.1685 
247 0.2507 0.2538 
248 0.3492 0.2104 
249 0.1766 0.03 
250 0.0456 0.027 
251 0.2909 0.2591 
252 0.1159 0.3017 
253 0.0174 0.1779 
254 0.6365 0.0364 
255 0.2871 0.2753 
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APPENDIX B 
AES algorithm 
The functions in AES algorithm can be grouped as AddRoundKey, 
SubBytes (Sbox), Shiftrows and Mixcolumns. The AddRoundKey operation 
combines the input data with a secret key. The Sbox function maps the 
input value with a corresponding value in the table. The table 
implementation can be done as a loo-up table or a dynamic computation. 
In this case, it is implemented as a look up table, ‘Etable’, loaded with pre-
calculated values. Similarly, for decryption, ‘Dtable’ is used. It is same as 
ETable in encryption but provides inverse look up results. The C code for 
Sbox implementation is as follows: 
for (i=0; i < size(ETable); i++) 
{ 
 Sbox(i) = ETable(Sbox(i)); 
} 
ETable[] = 
{ 
0x63,0x7C,0x77,0x7B,0xF2,0x6B,0x6F,0xC5,0x30,0x01,0x67,0x2B,0x
FE,0xD7,0xAB,0x76,0xCA,0x82,0xC9,0x7D,0xFA,0x59,0x47,0xF0,0xA
D,0xD4,0xA2,0xAF,0x9C,0xA4,0x72,0xC0,0xB7,0xFD,0x93,0x26,0x36,
0x3F,0xF7,0xCC,0x34,0xA5,0xE5,0xF1,0x71,0xD8,0x31,0x15,0x04,0x
C7,0x23,0xC3,0x18,0x96,0x05,0x9A,0x07,0x12,0x80,0xE2,0xEB,0x27
,0xB2,0x75,0x09,0x83,0x2C,0x1A,0x1B,0x6E,0x5A,0xA0,0x52,0x3B,0
xD6,0xB3,0x29,0xE3,0x2F,0x84,0x53,0xD1,0x00,0xED,0x20,0xFC,0x
B1,0x5B,0x6A,0xCB,0xBE,0x39,0x4A,0x4C,0x58,0xCF,0xD0,0xEF,0xA
A,0xFB,0x43,0x4D,0x33,0x85,0x45,0xF9,0x02,0x7F,0x50,0x3C,0x9F,
0xA8,0x51,0xA3,0x40,0x8F,0x92,0x9D,0x38,0xF5,0xBC,0xB6,0xDA,0
x21,0x10,0xFF,0xF3,0xD2,0xCD,0x0C,0x13,0xEC,0x5F,0x97,0x44,0x1
7,0xC4,0xA7,0x7E,0x3D,0x64,0x5D,0x19,0x73,0x60,0x81,0x4F,0xDC,
0x22,0x2A,0x90,0x88,0x46,0xEE,0xB8,0x14,0xDE,0x5E,0x0B,0xDB,0
xE0,0x32,0x3A,0x0A,0x49,0x06,0x24,0x5C,0xC2,0xD3,0xAC,0x62,0x9
1,0x95,0xE4,0x79,0xE7,0xC8,0x37,0x6D,0x8D,0xD5,0x4E,0xA9,0x6C,
0x56,0xF4,0xEA,0x65,0x7A,0xAE,0x08,0xBA,0x78,0x25,0x2E,0x1C,0x
A6,0xB4,0xC6,0xE8,0xDD,0x74,0x1F,0x4B,0xBD,0x8B,0x8A,0x70,0x3
E,0xB5,0x66,0x48,0x03,0xF6,0x0E,0x61,0x35,0x57,0xB9,0x86,0xC1,
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0x1D,0x9E,0xE1,0xF8,0x98,0x11,0x69,0xD9,0x8E,0x94,0x9B,0x1E,0x
87,0xE9,0xCE,0x55,0x28,0xDF,0x8C,0xA1,0x89,0x0D,0xBF,0xE6,0x4
2,0x68,0x41,0x99,0x2D,0x0F,0xB0,0x54,0xBB,0x16 
}; 
 
 
DTable[] = 
{ 
0x52,0x09,0x6A,0xD5,0x30,0x36,0xA5,0x38,0xBF,0x40,0xA3,0x9E,0x
81,0xF3,0xD7,0xFB,0x7C,0xE3,0x39,0x82,0x9B,0x2F,0xFF,0x87,0x34
,0x8E,0x43,0x44,0xC4,0xDE,0xE9,0xCB,0x54,0x7B,0x94,0x32,0xA6,0
xC2,0x23,0x3D,0xEE,0x4C,0x95,0x0B,0x42,0xFA,0xC3,0x4E,0x08,0x2
E,0xA1,0x66,0x28,0xD9,0x24,0xB2,0x76,0x5B,0xA2,0x49,0x6D,0x8B,
0xD1,0x25,0x72,0xF8,0xF6,0x64,0x86,0x68,0x98,0x16,0xD4,0xA4,0x
5C,0xCC,0x5D,0x65,0xB6,0x92,0x6C,0x70,0x48,0x50,0xFD,0xED,0xB
9,0xDA,0x5E,0x15,0x46,0x57,0xA7,0x8D,0x9D,0x84,0x90,0xD8,0xAB
,0x00,0x8C,0xBC,0xD3,0x0A,0xF7,0xE4,0x58,0x05,0xB8,0xB3,0x45,0
x06,0xD0,0x2C,0x1E,0x8F,0xCA,0x3F,0x0F,0x02,0xC1,0xAF,0xBD,0x0
3,0x01,0x13,0x8A,0x6B,0x3A,0x91,0x11,0x41,0x4F,0x67,0xDC,0xEA,
0x97,0xF2,0xCF,0xCE,0xF0,0xB4,0xE6,0x73,0x96,0xAC,0x74,0x22,0x
E7,0xAD,0x35,0x85,0xE2,0xF9,0x37,0xE8,0x1C,0x75,0xDF,0x6E,0x4
7,0xF1,0x1A,0x71,0x1D,0x29,0xC5,0x89,0x6F,0xB7,0x62,0x0E,0xAA,
0x18,0xBE,0x1B,0xFC,0x56,0x3E,0x4B,0xC6,0xD2,0x79,0x20,0x9A,0
xDB,0xC0,0xFE,0x78,0xCD,0x5A,0xF4,0x1F,0xDD,0xA8,0x33,0x88,0x
07,0xC7,0x31,0xB1,0x12,0x10,0x59,0x27,0x80,0xEC,0x5F,0x60,0x51,
0x7F,0xA9,0x19,0xB5,0x4A,0x0D,0x2D,0xE5,0x7A,0x9F,0x93,0xC9,0
x9C,0xEF,0xA0,0xE0,0x3B,0x4D,0xAE,0x2A,0xF5,0xB0,0xC8,0xEB,0x
BB,0x3C,0x83,0x53,0x99,0x61,0x17,0x2B,0x04,0x7E,0xBA,0x77,0xD
6,0x26,0xE1,0x69,0x14,0x63,0x55,0x21,0x0C,0x7D 
}; 
 
The next function after Sbox is the shift rows operation is performed on the 
result. The process of shift rows involves shifting the data. The first row is 
unchanged, the second row is shifted left once, and the third row is shifted 
left twice and so on. The C code for this the other functions in AES 
algorithm mixcolumns and AddRoundKey is included as separate 
functions. 
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void Encode_ShiftRow(unsigned char* sTable) 
{ 
 unsigned char temp; 
 
 /* first row (row 0) unchanged */ 
 
 /* second row (row 1) shifted left by one */ 
 temp=sTable[1]; 
 sTable[1]=sTable[5]; 
 sTable[5]=sTable[9]; 
 sTable[9]= sTable [13]; 
 sTable [13]=temp; 
  
 /* third row (row 2) shifted left by two */ 
 temp= sTable [2]; 
 sTable [2]= sTable [10]; 
 sTable [10]=temp; 
 temp= sTable [14]; 
 sTable [14]= sTable [6]; 
 sTable [6]=temp; 
 
 /* fourth row (row 3) shifted left by three (or right by one) */ 
 temp= sTable [3]; 
 sTable [3]= sTable [15]; 
 sTable [15]= sTable [11]; 
 sTable [11]= sTable [7]; 
 sTable [7]=temp; 
} 
#endif 
 
void Encode_MixColumn(unsigned char* block) 
{ 
 
for(i=0;i<16;i+=4) 
   { 
    aux1= block[i+0] ^ block[i+1]; 
    aux3= block[i+2]^block[i+3]; 
    aux = aux1 ^ aux3; 
    aux2= block[i+2]^block[i+1]; 
 
    aux1 = xtime(aux1); 
    aux2 = xtime(aux2); 
    aux3 = xtime(aux3); 
 
    block[i+0]= aux^aux1^block[i+0]; 
    block[i+1]= aux^aux2^block[i+1]; 
    block[i+2]= aux^aux3^block[i+2]; 
    block[i+3]= 
block[i+0]^block[i+1]^block[i+2]^aux; 
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   } 
  } 
} 
   
  /*   key addition */ 
  for(i=0;i<BLOCKSIZE;i++) 
  { 
   block[i] ^= key[i]; 
  } 
    
  _roundCounter--; 
 while(_roundCounter !=0); 
} 
#endif 
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APPENDIX C 
FPGA Implementation 
A two stage arithmetic pipeline deign consists of 16 bit adder and XOR 
gate is used to validate the technique proposed. The schematic view of the 
design is shown in Figure C.5. The two stage design is implemented in 
VHDL using Xilinx 14.7 IDE and targeted to Spartran 3E FPGA- xc3s500e-
4fg320. The proposed technique uses delayed clock to capture the late 
arrival of data. DCM (Digital Clock Manager) is used to create the phase 
delayed clock. To create DCM: Project -> New Source -> IP (Core 
Generator and Architecture wizard. Figure C.1, Figure C.2 shows the DCM 
creation wizard. The input, output clock frequencies and the required 
signals are selected in the creation wizard.  
 
Figure C.1: DCM Creation Wizard 
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Figure C.2: DCM Creation Wizard: selection of input and out signals 
Next, VHDL instantiation is done to use DCM in the original design. The 
divided clock signal (CLK_DIV) is given as the clock to the flip-flop in the 
case of errors. The selection can be done using a multiplexer. The DCM and 
selection circuit in VHDL is as follows: 
 
component DCM is                                       // VHDL Instantiation 
port ( 
CLKFB : in std_logic; 
CLKIN : in std_logic; 
RST : in std_logic; 
CLKDIV : out std_logic; 
LOCKED : out std_logic; 
end component; 
begin 
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DCM port map (                                    // port map in the design 
CLKFB => CLK, 
CLKIN => Sys_Clk, 
RST => Reset, 
CLKDIV => DCM_Clk; 
LOCKED => LOCKED); 
ff_clk <  Sys_clk when t_error  ‘ ’ else  
DCM_Clk;                                        // Multiplexer design to change 
clock to the flip-flop; 
 
The implemented design is verified using Xilinx simulator ISim. The 
required input signal values are selected using the panel. The simulation is 
run and verified for the correctness and bit file is generated to program the 
FPGA. The same procedure is repeated for all other FPGA modules.  
 
Figure C.4: Simulation waveforms using Xilinx Isim 
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Figure C.5: Schematic of the two stage arithmetic design 
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APPENDIX D 
Voltage Actuator 
The Simulink model of the switching regulator with a DC-DC buck 
converter along with a digital closed loop system is shown in Figure D.1. A 
switching regulator is the most commonly used configuration in 
embedded systems, especially aggressive scaling systems, to have a 
smooth transition between different modes. It is essential for many 
reasons, including the fact that it enables a stable operation while 
providing fast response. The model has four main units, ADC, PWM, 
digital compensator and buck converter. 
 
Figure D.1: Simulink model of switching regulator 
